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Book Reviews
The Dance of History
John Henry Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social
Science. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995. Pp.
xii, 418. $55.00
Christopher Shannon*
John Henry Schlegel has written a book that attempts to explain
why law has not followed the path of other academic disciplines in
adopting a natural-science model of empirical inquiry. He convin-
cingly argues that by the time legal academics confronted empirical
science in the guise of Legal Realism during the 1920's, American
legal education had already undergone a kind of scientific revolution:
the adoption in the late nineteenth century of the Langdellian case-
law method, a deductive approach that saw the law library as a
sufficient "field" for legal research. This intellectual practice, and the
* Christopher Shannon has taught American intellectual history at the University of Iowa
and Yale University. He is the author of Conspicuous Criticism: Tradition, the Individual and
Culture in American Social Thought from Veblen to Mills (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press 1996). He is currently working on a study of the Cold War origins of multiculturalism.
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professional identity that grew up around it, has made empirical
research a "square wheel" in American legal education!
Schlegel offers this contextual explanation for the marginality of
Realism as "an invitation to open a discussion about what intellectual
history... is and has become as this century closes" (260). Following
Realism's own move from legal texts to social contexts, Schlegel
insists that "rather than a history of ideas, intellectual history needs
to be the history of intellectuals, people who do things with ideas"
(5). In the spirit of this invitation, my Review focuses more on
Schlegel's approach to Realism than on his account of it. Schlegel
dismisses the history of ideas as "an essentially empty exercise," and
calls on historians to give up "the dance of reason" in order to
embrace "the whole dance of life" (4, 261). Schlegel's book, however,
reveals this move from text to context to be nothing more than the
dance of history, an essentially empty exercise in causal explanation.
In this Essay, I examine Schlegel's book not only as an account of
American Legal Realism, but also as a symptom of a fundamental
structural incoherence in the conception of intellectual history as an
academic discipline.
American Legal Realism is the legacy of a much broader intellec-
tual movement that Morton White long ago dubbed "the revolt
against formalism." In his classic Social Thought in America: The
Revolt Against Formalism, White characterized Gilded Age and
Progressive Era intellectual life in terms of a general reorientation
from a deductive rationalism to an inductive empiricism.2 In
philosophy, timeless verities gave way to a notion of historically
relative truths; in social theory, contractarian individualism gave way
to cultural organicism; and in economics, laissez-faire capitalism gave
way to a greater acceptance of government regulation.
Schlegel's account of Realism employs all the tropes of White's
revolt against formalism. Schlegel presents "classical" legal formalism
as "a way of organizing and thus understanding the world of common
and constitutional law in terms of hierarchically ordered, binary
categories" (31). Much of classical legal thought directed itself toward
the maintenance of one particular binary opposition, individual
freedom versus government control; moreover, legal scholars argued
this public/private distinction in terms of the "essential character" of
an activity rather than mere expediency (31-32). Against this concern
1. John Henry Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1995), 252. Subsequent page number citations are enclosed
in parentheses.
2. Morton Gabriel White, Social Thought in America: The Revolt Against Formalism (New
York: Viking Press, 1949).
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for the "teleological fitness" of legal decisions, Realism sought to
recast legal thought in terms of instrumental reason (49). Realists saw
law as "less a matter of the invariable application of norms ... and
more a matter of equitable, and thus variable, discretion on the part
of officials of the state" (44). Legal reasoning was to yield not sacred
"doctrines" but instrumental "rules," which were to be "organized not
with reference to principles but rather with respect to considerations
of policy, of social advantage" (226). Like the Progressive law
reformers who predated Realism proper, Realists wanted "to see the
law in action so as to reform the law in the books," and this
instrumental reformism "provided the reason for engaging in
empirical legal research" (229).
Schlegel's account of the general intellectual orientation of Realism
confirms the work of previous scholars, but adds little. Schlegel
attacks previous studies as too "rooted in the history-of-ideas
tradition," but then presents the received wisdom, the official "story"
of Realism that he claims to be revising, in social-historical terms (7).
The story "as the story is usually told" seems very much a story of
people and institutions (15).
The conventional account, as set forth by Schlegel, goes something
like this. Legal Realism began in the years following World War I as
a revolt against traditional legal education as practiced in American
universities. Nicholas Murray Butler, the president of Columbia
University, criticized legal education in America for being "too
narrow and technical," too divorced from ethics and intellectual
developments in the new social sciences (15). Prompted by these
criticisms, Harlan Fiske Stone, dean of the Columbia Law School,
appointed a committee to investigate the possibility of reforming legal
education. A key member of this committee, Herman Oliphant,
advocated a "functional" approach to the study of law, an approach
that stressed the importance of the social context of legal problems.
Oliphant hoped to incorporate the social sciences into the study of
law by dividing law into three categories-business relations, family
relations, and governmental relations-that would correspond to
economics, sociology, and political science. Despite a fairly positive
initial response, Oliphant's proposals had no effect on the curriculum
at Columbia.
At the same time, Robert Maynard Hutchins sought to incorporate
empirical social science into the curriculum at Yale. Like Oliphant,
Hutchins met with some initial interest followed by a reassertion of
the case-law method. As the established law schools lost interest in
the social sciences, Realists established their own school, the Institute
of Law, at Johns Hopkins. Headed by Walter Wheeler Cook, a
refugee from the Yale Law School, the Institute enjoyed a brief
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period of funding, yet Hopkins, too, soon lost interest. The Depres-
sion Era brought not only a scarcity of funds, but also a cultural
reaction against empirical social science as a naturalist philosophy
hostile to moral values. Given this economically and culturally hostile
environment, many Realists decided to take advantage of the new
employment opportunities available in various New Deal agencies,
and Realism simply died out (15-21).
Schlegel cautions that "some things may not have happened this
way" (15). He insists that the story as it is usually told bears "only a
modest resemblance to what it was like to be a Realist in the 1920's
and 1930's" (15). In the spirit of Realism itself, Schlegel sets out to
revise this story through his own empirical study of Realism. Schlegel
bases his story primarily on three case studies of Realism and Realists
at work: Charles E. Clark and William 0. Douglas at Yale, Underhill
Moore at Yale, and Walter Wheeler Cook at Johns Hopkins. Each
study offers a detailed account of the specific institutional context of
a specific brand of Realism, but the contexts rendered fail to alter, in
any fundamental way, the conventional understanding of Realism.
Schlegel concedes a "sameness" to "these three stories of empirical
legal research ... a recurrence of cases of modest success followed by
... well ... nothing" (211). He concludes that Realists "preached,
and occasionally delivered evidence of, the importance of an empirical
understanding of the workings of the legal system and yet somehow
Realism always returned to case-law analysis" (25). At this level,
Schlegel seems merely to confirm the story as it is usually told.
At another level, Schlegel takes issue not so much with the story of
Realism as with the causes of that story. He rejects the common
explanation that Realism failed because it had nothing to say, and
argues that the movement "gave out when, faced with the implications
of their own constructions, the protagonists lost their nerve" (2). He
traces this failure of nerve to the pressure of the professional identity
of the legal academic that developed before the advent of Realism in
the 1920's. The process of professionalizing the study of law at the
turn of the century entailed "the development of the norms of a
scholarly vocation" and the "identification and delineation of a field
of knowledge that would be peculiar to, and the exclusive preserve of,
the nascent legal academics" (36). Conceived by James Barr Ames
of Harvard and propagated by the newly formed Association of
American Law Schools, this new professional ideology demanded a
commitment to the production of "detailed, systematic, sustained,
and comprehensive works of scholarship on the German grand scale"
(27). In developing professional standards for acceptable research,
this first generation of legal academics drew on a case-law method of
library research fundamentally at odds with the empirical approach
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that would come to dominate the social science professions in the
1920's. Law and the social sciences followed a similar process of
professionalization, yet developed professional standards so distinct
as to allow for little dialogue across professional boundaries.
Schlegel argues that by the 1920's the Realists had undergone a
process of "internalization of professional norms and practices" that
ultimately hindered their commitment to Realism (70). He presents
this psychological process as a product of a specific social experience,
a period of "colonial service" in Midwestern state universities, where
many of the Realists developed a commitment to the legal profession
that would eventually lead them back to the more prestigious Eastern
law schools (27). These "colonial officers" developed a "mutual
support network" at once intellectual and social: a "Chicago summer
session" seminar served as the "main site for ... intellectual inter-
change," while "treks around and about Madison's two beautiful lakes
and time in Chicago's beer gardens" provided the "social" setting for
the development of the Realists' professional vocation (36, 40).
Schlegel's contextual approach balances social history with
biography, what he calls "the 'accident' of person" (213). Schlegel
explains the failure of Realism not only as a consequence of profes-
sionalization, but also in terms of the personal idiosyncracies of the
Realists themselves. The Realists were a "restless" and "ca-
ntankerous" lot (253). They were attracted to the study of law, but
they were "unhappy with the world of the common law professor"
(224). Lapsing into armchair psychology, Schlegel declares that
"while malcontents often drift away from the activity that makes them
unhappy, they can also attempt to improve their situation by
remaking that activity." Moving from psychology to psychopathology,
Schlegel suggests that Realists were attracted to empirical social
science precisely because of its opposition to "law's traditional
wisdom," and pursued Realism in order to feed their malcontented-
ness (224).
A proper social historian, Schlegel allows for individual differences
within this general psychological orientation and links particular
psychologies to particular career paths. Walter Wheeler Cook, the
most restless and least secure of the Realists, found in Realism "the
home, the stability he had made for himself in his restlessness" (80).
Reflective by nature, Cook "spent a long time and much effort
growing into a scholarly vocation in his chosen field" (79). Legal
analytics "afforded an outlet for the basic combativeness of Cook's
personality," a combativeness that ironically ensured both his
commitment to Realism and his failure to sustain the professional
friendships necessary for building an institutional base for Realism
(79, 220). Underhill Moore, in contrast, was "more secure than Cook,
19961 499
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities [Vol. 8: 495
less reflective" (80). Moore had "a nonacademic identity" developed
in his private practice and had little interest in developing a scholarly
vocation. He sought in Realism simply a "social understanding of
law" that could be used for practical, progressive reform. Moore had
no patience for legal analytics, and when faced with resistance from
the legal academy, he simply abandoned empirical research.
Schlegel provides a balanced and convincing explanation of the
institutional trajectory of Legal Realism and Legal Realists. He
accomplishes what he set out to do: Embracing both biography and
social history, he provides a model of intellectual history as the
history of intellectuals. Ironically, the strengths of the book reveal the
weaknesses of intellectual history as a scholarly endeavor.
Schlegel rightly identifies empirical research as a square wheel in
the legal academy, yet he fails to consider his social history of
intellectuals as a round wheel that fits all too well into the practice of
academic history. I realize that Schlegel writes as a legal academic
rather than as a historian, but, as an intellectual historian, I find his
assessment of the current state of intellectual history to be something
of a straw man. Legal history is itself still a kind of square wheel that
has yet to find a secure place in the legal academy, and much of the
work on the history of Realism may be of an older history-of-ideas
style, but that style is far from the mainstream of the current practice
of intellectual history.
Schlegel throws down the same gauntlet that social historians threw
down in the 1970's, and picks it up in much the same way as intellec-
tual historians of that era. Works like Thomas Haskell's The
Emergence of Professional Social Science and Mary 0. Furner's
Advocacy and Objectivity, both written some twenty years ago,
answered the objections of social historians by proposing the very
professionalization thesis that Schlegel relies on so heavily in his
book.3 Schlegel convincingly argues that as an interdisciplinary
movement, Legal Realism fell between the cracks of professions
concerned primarily with maintaining their distinct institutional
identities within the university; however, since the late 1970's,
"professionalization" has been used to explain just about everything
that intellectuals have said and done in the twentieth century.
Schlegel does cite Haskell and Furner in a footnote, but his opening
polemic suggests that he is in some way the first person to examine
professionalization as a serious factor in intellectual history (273).
3. See Thomas L. Haskell, The Emergence of Professional Social Science (Urbana: University
of Illinois Press, 1977); Mary 0. Furner, Advocacy and Objectivity (Lexington: University of
Kentucky Press, 1975).
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I do not mean simply to criticize Schlegel for a lack of originality.
In an academic profession driven by novelty, this may be an issue for
some, but I feel that Schlegel's polemic raises issues deeper than the
proper acknowledgment of scholarly debt. Schlegel's method and
subject matter are intimately linked. His social history of intellectuals
stands as a Realist history of American Legal Realism. Ironically,
Schlegel's own account of Realism as an intellectual orientation
constantly calls into question the validity of the Realist project, and
by implication the validity of his own. Schlegel's insistence on an
institutional explanation for the failure of Realism works against his
own evidence of the intellectual failure of Realism in its own terms.
Schlegel's empirical study of the Realists suggests the Realists'
empirical study of the law was, itself, an essentially empty exercise.
In case after case, Schlegel judges the empirical data collected by the
Realists to be either predictable or inconclusive. Schlegel cites three
major studies at Yale: Charles E. Clark and William 0. Douglas's
joint study of court congestion, Douglas's study of the administration
of bankruptcy law, and Clark's study of auto accident compensation.
Schlegel concludes: "If what was wanted was the facts on which to
base the argument for reform, quantitative empirical research either
produced too many, as in the courts studies, or worse, a very few at
an enormous cost, as in the business failures or auto accidents
projects" (230). Underhill Moore fares no better in Schlegel's
assessment: "Moore's view of science brought with it few ideas with
real explanatory power," and while it "allowed one to study anything,
it was remarkably thin in the help that it offered with the task of
coming to understand the meaning of what one learned" (233).
The contrast between Schlegel's sympathy for the Realists and
skepticism toward Realism appears nowhere more glaring than in his
account of the greatest of the Realists, Walter Wheeler Cook.
According to Schlegel, it was Cook "alone among the Realists who
had a well worked out understanding of what it was to apply scientific
method to law" (224). Not a particularly original thinker, Cook
nonetheless brought the Deweyan, pragmatic revolt against formalism
to bear on the study of law. He insisted that "human laws are
devices, tools, which society uses to regulate and promote human
relations" (154). Judges and lawyers should evaluate "a given rule of
law.., by finding how it works" rather than by how well it conforms
to established legal principles (154). With these notions, "Cook
literally dragged the modern idea of science into law" (225). Schlegel
insists that "this was a significant achievement"; he concludes,
however, that the program of Cook's major Realist undertaking, the
Institute of Law at Johns Hopkins, simply did not "hang together"
(225, 223). Even as Schlegel concludes "there was no program" at the
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Institute, he insists that "all this aside there were real achievements"
(243).
This tension cannot be excused as interpretive balance. It borders
on textual schizophrenia. Schlegel declares that Cook's ideas "offered
absolutely no innate direction for research" (158). He presents the
Institute of Law at Hopkins as "nothing more than a mishmash of
what each individual ... wanted to do" (205). There "was no
theoretical or even less grandiose idea that might have grounded the
Institute's research.., no agreement on what a scientific approach to
law meant" (205). In one instance, the Institute undertook a study of
the courts of Ohio, Maryland, and New York to investigate the
excessive cost, duration, and uncertainty of litigation. Schlegel
concludes that "although there were interesting facts presented along
the way and occasionally quite penetrating insights into modern
litigation, it was usually the case that it was unclear what the study
might prove" (179). Indeed, the survey of the courts provided "an
interesting, massive, but wholly un-thought-out agglomeration of data,
hypotheses, projects, and opinions" that evoked a "sense of simple
technique overrunning understanding" (181, 204). Having said all
this, Schlegel nonetheless insists that such problems "ought not to be
allowed to overwhelm the positive achievement of these studies"
(204). Well, for this reader, they should.
Schlegel's evidence consistently belies his conclusions. The problem
lies not in Schlegel's scholarship, but in the sentiments he brings to his
scholarship, sentiments he makes clear in his polemic on intellectual
history. Schlegel writes as a Realist, as someone who believes that
truth lies in empirical inquiry into the "social, economic, or legal
conditions or practices" of ideas; consequently, his work suffers from
the same deficiencies he finds in Realism (21). The Institute of Law's
court studies vacillated between truism ("the data were reasonably
smooth along the classic American urban-rural axis") and nihilism
("but within groups chaos reigned") (204). Similarly, Schlegel's
account of Realism vacillates between clich6s about profes-
sionalization and profiles of the "accident of person" that work
against any generalizations about historical processes or the nature of
American Legal Realism.
I do not disagree with Schlegel's account of the institutional course
of Realism. I do feel, however, that his account suffers from a
problem similar to that of a study proposed by Underhill Moore: "A
suggestion to go to Cincinnati to 'observe the operations of bank
tellers at close range' was pointless when a call to a friendly banker
coupled with a bit of imagination would provide the same infor-
mation" (237). The failure of law to follow other humanistic
disciplines in modelling itself on empirical social science may seem
Shannon
strange when one considers the norms that shape most of twentieth-
century American intellectual life; however, when one considers the
hundreds of years of prescientific practice that the legal profession
brought to its confrontation with empirical social science, it appears
less strange. By the late nineteenth century, secular academics had
successfully marginalized the central discipline of a classical
humanities education, theology. Empirical social science did not
transform the classical curriculum so much as it created an entirely
new one-the academic division of labor that plagues us to this day.
Law followed a different path. The secular rationalism of the
Constitution may have transformed the understanding of common law
in nineteenth-century America, but it could not completely eradicate
the "insider" perspective of common-law interpretation.4  The
nineteenth century disestablished religion, but it did not disestablish
law. Legal discourse retains an air of sanctity largely lacking in the
humanities due to its connection to "sacred," pre-scientific
interpretive traditions. Schlegel describes the translation of these
traditions into "professional norms," but he fails to explain their
persistence in the face of the modern assault on the sacred. Beyond
an armchair observation on the weight of institutional continuity, I do
not see how this persistence could be explained.
To be fair, Schlegel explicitly rejects "the heavy hand of the
contemporary historian/explainer" and insists that "the point of this
book is the stories" (12, 13). This raises the question: What is the
point of the stories? Like so many of the court studies undertaken by
the Realists, Schlegel's biographical portraits may be interesting, and
they may provide insights into individual personalities, but it is not
clear what they prove. Cook's failure to get along with his coworkers
may have contributed to the ultimate failure of the Institute of Law,
but according to Schlegel, internalized professional norms had already
stacked the historical deck against Realism regardless of the per-
sonalities of individual Realists. Lacking any strong explanatory
power, these professional biographies merely "prove" what Schlegel
calls "that humanistic ideal-people trying their best to get from
Monday to Tuesday in as honorable a job as they have managed to
find" (261). Far from being "deeply postmodern," this bureaucratic
existentialism represents one classic strain of nonrevolutionary
modernism, perhaps best embodied in Freud's affirmation of the
rational analysis of everyday life in pursuit of ordinary everyday
unhappiness. One does not need to "embrace ... biography and
4. See generally Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1870-1960: The
Crisis of Legal Orthodoxy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).
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social history" in order to prove this ideal; one could just as easily
read Freud. Of course, people never really "prove" this ideal, they
simply affirm it. As advertisements for the nihilism of modern
humanism, Schlegel's stories reduce life to the everyday world of
work and love.5
At times, Schlegel's account of Realism calls his own humanistic
values into question. Schlegel expresses some dissatisfaction with the
influence of John Dewey on Realism, and on Walter Wheeler Cook
in particular. The greatest humanistic philosopher in twentieth-
century America, Dewey constructed his pragmatic philosophy around
the "primary assertion ... that people do not think axiomatically in
syllogisms but, rather, with an end or problem in view" (68). Schlegel
follows Dewey by accepting the primacy of instrumental reason to
human life, but concedes that "Dewey's insight said absolutely
nothing about what to think about and, indeed, in its generality, it
suggested that one might think pragmatically about anything at all"
(68). The lack of direction in Cook's Institute of Law would seem to
be as much a problem of ideas as of personal idiosyncracies or
professional norms. My frustration with Schlegel parallels his
frustration with Dewey and Cook: To say that intellectual history
should be the history of intellectuals who do things with ideas does
not tell us which intellectuals we should study, and implies that we
might study any intellectuals at all. The only criterion for fit subject
matter would seem to be proximity to the humanist ideal of
bureaucratic muddling through.
Schlegel justifies his book as a search for "intellectual heroes"
(259). Ironically, the book finds as its hero not an intellectual, but an
idea: the idea of history itself. Despite his admiration for the Realists,
Schlegel criticizes them for ignoring history in favor of "narrowly
quantitative studies" (235). Schlegel sees in the grand tradition of
European historical sociology a road not taken, one capable of
providing "alternative frameworks for understanding" the data
collected by the Realists in their various empirical studies. He argues
that this tradition "was closed off to the Realists ... for reasons of
language, discipline, approach, and source," but concedes that the
Realists refused to engage even "the good American historical
scholarship of Henry Adams, Charles Beard, and James Harvey
Robinson" (235).
Schlegel explains this refusal in terms of the prevailing understan-
ding of history in the legal academy: "Unfortunately, but understan-
5. On the place of work and love in modem thought, see Charles Taylor, "The Affirmation
of Ordinary Life," pt. 3 of Sources of the Self The Making of Modern Identity (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1989).
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dably, the Realists conflated history with one of its types, doctrinal
history, and so eschewed history altogether because for them it had
the wrong resonance" (235). Realists saw in doctrinal history a
formalism too tied up with the tradition of legal interpretation to be
able to get outside of the law and examine it objectively. The
European and American historical traditions offered models of
thinking that combined methodological looseness with a "rigidly
objective ... treatment of sources" (235). Cut off from these
traditions, Realists drew on the increasingly tighter methodology of
American sociology. Schlegel concludes: "Theirs would be a red-
blooded American's quantitative empiricism even if the collection of
totals and analysis of percentages benumbed the brain" (236).
Presumably, an engagement with history would have provided a
qualitative antidote to this vulgar, quantitative empiricism.
Schlegel fails to make clear just what "quality" history could have
brought to the social-scientific study of law. Schlegel's book,
however, makes clear that historical studies of American Legal
Realism tend to be occasions for reflecting on the tension between a
qualitative and a quantitative social science, and affirming the need
for both in the scientific study of man and society. Morton Horwitz's
The Transformation of American Law, 1870-1960, presents a different
portrait of Realism than Schlegel's book, but also sees the historical
significance of Realism in terms of the tension between quantity and
quality in humanistic inquiry. Horwitz argues that the "critical thrust
of Realism has been virtually smothered by the exaggerated emphasis
placed on the Realist turn to social science." Identification with "the
most intellectually regressive forms of behavioral and value-free social
science" has obscured "a central element of the Realist legacy-its
interpretive or hermeneutic understanding of reality.",6
Unlike Schlegel, Horwitz insists that the Realists were "passionate
about values." Horwitz blames the tendency toward "ethical
positivism" in American legal discourse on the neutral-principles
school that rose up in reaction to Realism in the years following
World War II. This school of interpretation rejected the Realists'
insistence on the connection between law, politics, and morality in
favor of a "morality of process" independent of results. The triumph
of this separation of law from politics has enabled American legal
discourse "to hide behind unhistorical and abstract universalisms in
order to deny, even to itself, its own political and moral choices. '
Schlegel and Horwitz disagree on the Realists, but they agree on
6. Horwitz, Transformation of American Law, 181.
7. Ibid., 182, 253, 268, 272.
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history: Both link history to some kind of moral sensibility, and in
grand humanist fashion insist that such a sensibility be brought to
bear on the study of law.
Like most historians of social science, historians of Legal Realism
tell a story of the conflict between positivism and humanism, between
a value-free and a value-informed mode of inquiry.8 Historians who
tell this story tend to write from a humanist perspective, and tend to
conclude with some kind of affirmation of "values." A representative
work in this genre of historical writing, Schlegel's book unintentional-
ly reveals the opposition of positivism and humanism to be false, and
the affirmation of "values" to be empty. Schlegel more-or-less
successfully reconstructs the meaning of Realism through his
reconstruction of the context of Realism, but his social-historical
reconstruction provides no basis for an ethical evaluation of Realism
itself.
Schlegel's biographical approach may avoid the mind-numbing
"collection of totals and analysis of percentages" commonly associated
with positivism, but apart from any explicit normative context for
inquiry, biographical sketches themselves appear as mind-numbing
"facts"-interesting perhaps, but of questionable significance.
Schlegel's social history of intellectuals places text in context without
addressing the problem of how one evaluates text or context once one
has accepted the positivist assumptions of empirical social science. In
this way, it embodies the very procedural norms so often decried by
historians of Realism and American legal discourse in general. Like
so much of academic history writing, Schlegel's book embodies an
"operational aesthetic" geared merely toward revealing the mechanics
of history.9
For truth, Schlegel substitutes moralism. This moralism, moreover,
reveals itself to be as much a procedural norm as the social history of
intellectuals. Schlegel concludes his book with an affirmation of the
Realists as "intellectual heroes" who "expressed care, concern, and
patience in carrying ... work to a conclusion," had "idea[s] [they]
passionately believed in," and possessed "extraordinary flinty integrity
and seriousness of purpose" (257). The Realists may have possessed
these qualities, but none of these qualities are specific to Realists or
Realism. Schlegel's book suggests that passionate belief in an idea is
8. For a recent example, see Dorthy Ross, The Origins of American Social Science
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
9. I take this phrase from Neil Harris's account of P. T. Barnum's museum of freaks and
curiosities. Perhaps not as entertaining as Barnum's shows, academic history has become
increasingly Barnumesque with every passing year, and continues to prove that, yes indeed,
there is a sucker born every minute. See Neil Harris, Humbug: The Art of P. T. Barnum
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973), chap. 3.
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more important than any particular idea believed in, and that serious-
ness itself is more important than any purpose to which seriousness
could be directed.
This procedural orientation unites the social history of intellectuals
with the history of ideas. I agree with Schlegel that the history of
ideas is "an essentially empty exercise," but not because it fails to
connect ideas to a material context. Connecting ideas to a material
context does not tell us something more than connecting ideas to
other ideas, it simply tells us something different. Ideas and texts may
serve as contexts for understanding related ideas and texts. As
contexts change, so will meanings. This excess of meaning leads to
calls for synthesis, and synthesis soon leads to calls for revision. The
belief that "it is an important thing for any culture to know where the
ideas in its past and present came from" drives this process in social
history and the history of ideas (259). Just why it is important to
trace the course of ideas over time is not clear to me from Schlegel's
book. Schlegel does not argue for history, he simply assumes it, and
affirms it. In this existential affirmation, process becomes substance.
Still, the textual genealogies of the history of ideas and the contextual
genealogies of social history both fail to provide any basis for
evaluating the ideas and intellectuals studied.
Why is it important to know where ideas come from? To play the
devil's advocate, I will explain one clich6 in terms of another: We
study the transformation of ideas over time because those who do not
know the past are destined to repeat it. In this spirit, Schlegel draws
a practical lesson from his study of Realism: "Until some genius
comes up with some reason for seeing law as something else, and sells
it in a culture where currently the only alternative understanding of
law available is that of... law as who you know... there is no point
in talking" (256-57). As practical advice, this amounts to asserting
that we need to change the culture before we can bring about cultural
change. Professional identity "explains" the failure of Realism about
as well as dormative powers explain why opium causes sleep. Legal
Realism and the professional history monograph of the type Schlegel
has written both grew out of a Progressive intellectual ferment
committed to the belief that the new social sciences could tame the
irrationalities of the market by revealing the chain of causality that
drives the development of society. Against this faith, the twentieth
century has seen the irrationality of the market merely supplemented
by the irrationality of the state. The social sciences have failed to
deliver the control promised in the fields they successfully shaped in
their own image; there is no reason to think that law has much to
learn from them. Social-scientific causality is little more than
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common sense and tautology. The study of the past cannot bring
control.
Of course, one may study the past for other reasons. Schlegel's
stated purpose of finding "intellectual heroes" or role models suggests
that the study of the past may serve as a means for character building
or personal edification. This merely begs the question of what kind
of character one should build and why. Schlegel presents a convin-
cing portrait of the Realists as iconoclastic-but-committed academic
bureaucrats, but does not advance any convincing argument for the
worth of this character type. Indeed, such substantive arguments lie
outside the procedural norms of history writing. Even so "rarified"
an intellectual historian as Arthur 0. Lovejoy never argued for the
ideas he studied; he merely argued about them. Lovejoy led the fight
against Realism at Hopkins, but his brand of the history of ideas
objectifies the past in a manner similar to the Realist social history
practiced by Schlegel.10 Lovejoy clearly sympathizes with the ideas
he studies in his masterpiece, The Great Chain of Being, and Schlegel
clearly sympathizes with the Realists, but neither historian claims to
be bound to their subject matter in any substantive way; indeed, both
scholars accept objective detachment from their subject matter as a
precondition for proper historical inquiry. Lovejoy and Schlegel
submit not to the authority of the texts/contexts that they study, but
to the procedural norms of evidence and argument that structure
professional history writing. Their work may tell us in different ways
how certain ideas develop over time, but it cannot tell us if these
ideas are true. Failing the test of truth, the "rarified atmosphere" of
the history of ideas and the solid ground of social history are both "so
much hot air" (208).
The problem of the relation of the historian to history points to a
central issue in Realism itself. According to Schlegel, the conflict
between the formalism of nineteenth-century legal science and the
antiformalism of twentieth-century Legal Realism may be understood
in terms of the conflict between the perspectives of the insider and
the outsider. From the insider perspective, "law was about norms"
(227). "Legal scientists examined case reports and from the cases
derived ... doctrines that were fit into a system of principles that
governed the action of judges because they formed the law" (226).
Progressive reformers working within the tradition of legal science
accepted the normative authority of legal rules, and sought simply to
make existing rules better. Legal Realism drew instead on Oliver
10. See Arthur 0. Lovejoy, "Introduction: The Study of the History of Ideas," in The Great
Chain of Being: A Study of the History of an Idea (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957),
3. Lovejoy compares the study of the history of ideas to "analytic chemistry."
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Wendell Holmes' prediction theory of law, which "suggested that it
was plausible for a party inside the system to act as if he were
observing the system" from the outside (227). Thus, Walter Wheeler
Cook insisted that legal research, whether in the library or in the
field, should yield "rules ... organized not with reference to
principles but rather with respect to considerations of policy, of social
advantage" (226). This outsider, instrumental view of the law
''suggested that the legal science of the insiders produced not the
objective truth that it had always purported but something else" (227).
Skeptical of the insider perspective, Cook could not dismiss it
completely without cutting himself off from the legal profession that
for the most part operated within it. In the grand pragmatic tradition,
Cook simply never bothered to reconcile the two perspectives. As
Schlegel sums up this evasion: "Anything could be done scientifically:
one simply adapted the available tools to the materials and objectives
at hand and set to work at whatever one wanted" (227). Outsiders
and insiders could peacefully co-exist, making use of each other's
work when it suited their goals, and otherwise ignoring it. Cook's
compromise "literally dragged the modem idea of science into law,"
yet "enabled law to avoid the awful morass of statistical method in
which social science still finds itself" (225, 228).
A similar compromise has come to structure the humanities in
general in the wake of the pragmatic revolt against formalism.
Schlegel's own book embodies the very insider/outsider schizophrenia
he analyzes in law. Strident assertions of value (the humanistic ideal)
co-exist with strident assertions of value-free objectivity (the social
history of intellectuals), both of which co-exist with strident
qualifications of value and objectivity ("I have no illusions ... that
my narrative is more direct, more unmediated, less controlled than
would be the case were I to adopt a more argumentative form of
presentation") (13). The academic division of labor has ensured that
these contradictory orientations rarely appear together in a single
work, and this arrangement has proven comfortable enough for so
long as there has been a basic agreement on the ends of humanistic
inquiry. These ends found their clearest formulation in the "conse-
nsus" era following World War II: economic prosperity through some
form of a mixed economy, and cultural cosmopolitanism through
government support of the arts and education.
Since the early 1970's, the political mood of the country has shifted
against these values. Universities and law schools in particular have
come under attack as strongholds of a cultural cosmopolitanism
perceived as hostile to tradition. The left-liberal consensus that still
dominates the mainstream of the academy has responded with ever
more strident assertions of an increasingly empty humanist ideal, and
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ever more paranoid denunciations of the "authoritarian personality"
of their opponents; both strategies suggest desperation. Against the
ethically and intellectually bankrupt humanism of the academy,
mainstream conservatives have attempted to revive the "traditional"
nineteenth-century virtues of free markets and family values; this, too,
suggests desperation. There is nothing "traditional" about these
values. The free market of the nineteenth century defined itself
against not only the decaying feudal order and the mercantilist state,
but also against all traditions that might restrict the pursuit of
economic self-interest. Middle-class ideologues of domesticity
reinvented the family as a separate sphere of value apart from the
amoral marketplace, but this arrangement has long since proved
incapable of protecting the family from the totalizing logic of the
market. By embracing the "value" of economic growth, conservatives
ensure instability in the family and every other would-be "sacred"
sphere of life.
The sterility of the humanist outsider perspective and the vacuity
of the conservative pseudo-insider perspective reflect the persistent
failure of American intellectuals to reconcile Enlightenment univer-
salism with some substantive understanding of tradition. This failure
has been particularly glaring in American law. During the nineteenth
century, American judges and lawyers struggled to accommodate the
outsider perspective of the Constitution with the insider perspective
of common law. The Constitution soon became something like holy
writ, man-made yet handed down, invested with all the sanctity of an
ancient tradition; however, common law soon changed from a body
of principles to be applied to specific cases to, in Morton Horwitz's
words, "a creative instrument for directing men's energies toward
social change."11 The principle of instrumentality has since provided
a rather dubious basis for reconciling tradition and revolution in
American law. Law remains an exegetical tradition bound by the
authority of precedent, yet American law offers only a precedent of
change hostile to all tradition.
Of course, debate over the "traditional" status of American law
depends on some explicit understanding of the meaning of tradition.
I take as my standard the social relations of knowledge embodied in
what Roberto Unger, in his Knowledge and Politics, has identified as
the "dogmatic disciplines" of grammar, theology, and legal doctrine.
Within these traditional disciplines, there is no "clear distinction
between the object accounted for and the account itself." In the case
of law, "the legal doctrine participates in the evolution of. .. the law,
11. Horwitz, Transformation of American Law, 1.
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helping define its shape and determine its directions." The
"reasonings of lawyers and judges are drawn from the very tradition
they expound and develop," and "because of the intimate relationship
between the account and its object, every claim... is an elaboration
of some point of view already present in the community" of legal
interpretation. 2
American Legal Realism stands at the opposite pole from this
understanding of law as a tradition. John Henry Schlegel's account
of Realism argues that American law operates somewhere between
the extremes of a pure insider and pure outsider perspective. Like his
historical subjects, Schlegel, too, operates between those extremes.
Schlegel's social history of intellectuals reduces the ideas of Realism
to their historical context, only to affirm those ideas as transcendent
values. If this be "the whole dance of life," it would appear that the
jig is up. The outsider perspective denies the truth status of the
insider perspective, yet detaches itself from all the normative ordering
principles necessary to make sense of the reality it objectively renders.
Olympian denials of truth vacillate with existential affirmations of
truth. This schizophrenia seemed to "work" during the glory days of
academia in the 1950's. I suppose as long as enough lawyers and legal
historians have enough jobs, it will still seem to "work" despite its
lack of intellectual coherence. For those content with this in-
coherence, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science
provides a comfortable and comforting reading experience.




No Lever and No Place to Stand
(A Response to Christopher Shannon)
John Henry Schlegel*
Rage, rage against the dying of the light.
Dylan Thomas
It is rather difficult for me to respond to a rage so fierce that at
times it seems to lapse into incoherence, but I shall try. What I have
done to bring forth such a rage seems to be two things. First is my
celebration of the quotidian in the lives of intellectuals ... most
significantly for Mr. Shannon, though by no means my exclusive focus,
their just getting on in a bureaucratic world. The second has to do
with the lack of articulated grounds for my judgments of value, my
apparent lack of commitment to truth. Both are said to play out in
indefensible (or at least undefended) choices with respect to what
stories to tell, what heroes to celebrate, what ideas to care about.
And somehow all of this undermines what intellectual history should
be about.
I make no bones about my reasons for doing as I do, so let me be
clear about these matters. I cannot say what the life of an intellectual
was like in 1850, 1750, or 1650, but I can say that for the past hundred
or so years the major locus of intellectual activity has been in
bureaucratic institutions-universities, magazines of opinion, think
tanks. And yet we intellectuals on the whole think and write as if the
standard of value in our business is the life of a Newton or a
Rousseau or a Kant or some other independently wealthy gentleman,
or retainer of such, someone for whom getting and spending is
somehow unproblematic, and then flagellate ourselves in private (and
occasionally in public) for not living up to that standard, for not
* John Henry Schlegel is a Professor of Law at the State University of New York at Buffalo.
He regularly writes on the past and present of legal education and legal thought. Laura, Fred,
and Jim checked my judgment on this one; for that kindness I absolve them of blame.
1. Dylan Thomas, Do Not Go Gentle into That Good Night, in THE NORTON ANTHOLOGY
OF POETRY 1181, 1181 (Alexander W. Allison ed., 3d ed. 1983).
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thinking transcendent thoughts all the time. We do ourselves ill by
not recognizing the context in which we live and work and then
measuring our lives by that context. To wish to measure ourselves by
some context that we neither live in nor can recreate is that ultimate
act of ahistoricity by an intellectual historian. I will not adopt such
a measure and so sell hardworking humans short. And so I
celebrate-with one or two cheers, never three-those who in the face
of this quotidian existence seem to me to manage to do something
that vaguely passes for noble, or fine, or admirable. Doing such in
the bureaucratic institutions we all inhabit is, after all, a real
achievement.
How then do I choose my heroes, my stories, my valuable ideas?
Very simply. By myself in my own lights. The buck stops with me.
As best as I can tell there is no truth, only an absence of lies. Though
there are dozens of ways to recount the story that reaches this
conclusion, I would begin with the observation that the Reformation
killed the truth of revelation mediated by the Church Universal. The
Enlightenment killed the Reformation's understanding of truth as
revelation directly accessible to the believer. And the horrors
associated with World War II killed the Enlightenment's notion of
truth as revelation accessible through reason alone. There is no
longer (nor ever was there) a transcendental, transpersonal, transhis-
torical basis for our value judgments. We make them all up.
This is not to say that man is the measure of all things. There is no
measure of all things, only contested and contestable measures of
some things. My stories, my heroes, my valuable ideas are my
attempt to suggest, in the only way I as a historian know how, what
stories are important, who ought to be taken to be a hero, which ideas
are worth taking seriously. In aid of this activity I have nothing but
verisimilitude, a range of experience hopefully shared with my
readers, and the possibility that others share or can be persuaded to
share my values.
Truth is by definition unattainable to fallen man and fallen man is
the only one we have ever had. I thus make no claim to infallibility
but deeply feel the limitations of my judgments. As an author I ask
others to consider by their own lights-and none other-whether my
stories are illuminating of a time past, whether my heroes were
worthy in a time past, whether the ideas I value were useful for
something at a time past. These are modest questions. Fallen man
can ask only modest questions. But they are the questions I think are
meaningful to ask about intellectuals and the product of their lives.
I also think they are sensible questions. After all, though one need
not agree with Faulkner about man's triumph, and though the litany
of outrages perpetrated by humans on each other is endless, still the
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amazing thing is that without the aid of Truth (whatever we thought
we had) we have built a remarkably rich and powerful body of
thought in a deep and complex (though often meretricious) culture.
Though hardly of transcendental significance-after all, the cock-
roaches will surely outlast our species-building this in the face of the
second law of thermodynamics is no mean trick.
I would enjoy talking about the products of human culture in this
way with Mr. Shannon, for they are obviously very important to him.
But before we do so, I would ask him to consider the possibility that
the appropriate response to my assertion that there is no lever and no
place to stand when we make judgments in this fallen, bureaucratic
world is not rage, but a willingness to engage in the hard work of
telling meaningful stories, seeking meaningful heroes, identifying
meaningful ideas ... of building values as best as we humans can.
Let us try together, Sir. You would be surprised how little one misses
what one never had.

Empathy and Judgment
Martha C. Nussbaum, Poetic Justice: The Literary Imagination and
Public Life. Boston: Beacon Press, 1996. Pp. xvii, 137. $20.
Thomas Morawetz*
Reclaiming the place of philosophy as a metadiscipline,1
philosophers have once more assumed the role of mediating boundary
disputes among other disciplines. As the boundaries and shapes of
various disciplines have grown vague and controversial, that role has
become particularly significant and particularly quixotic as well.2
Those who play this role have many audiences. Some speak primarily
to, and about, scholars. Others concern themselves with pedagogy.
Still others think about the impact of the disciplines on public officials
and public affairs.
The relationship of law and literature is an especially fruitful
interface for such scrutiny. Although courses on law and literature
have proliferated in law schools, accompanied by a bull market in
interdisciplinary articles, books, and journals,3 there is little
agreement about the content and purpose of these activities. Indeed,
there seem to be almost as many ways of giving content to law and
literature as there are practitioners of it. This intersection of dis-
ciplines may variously become
* Thomas Morawetz is Tapping Reeve Professor of Law and Ethics at the University of
Connecticut School of Law. He has published widely in jurisprudence, ethics, and criminal law.
1. "The notion that there is an autonomous discipline called 'philosophy,' distinct from and
sitting in judgment upon both religion and science, is of quite recent origin.... [This is] the
sense in which it has been understood as an academic subject in the nineteenth century."
RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE 131 (1979). The philosophical
contributions of Ludwig Wittgenstein and Richard Rorty are widely understood as challenging
this traditional way of conceiving of philosophy, and they have been influential in doing so. See
also THE RETURN OF GRAND THEORY IN THE HUMAN SCIENCES (Quentin Skinner ed., 1985).
2. See THE INSTITUTION OF PHILOSOPHY: A DISCIPLINE IN CRISIS (Avner Cohen & Marcelo
Dascal eds., 1989); REDRAWING THE LINES: ANALYTICAL PHILOSOPHY, DECONSTRUCrION,
AND LITERARY THEORY (Reed W. Dasenbrook ed., 1989).
3. The proliferation of courses and research on law and literature is discussed in Elizabeth
Villiers Gemmette, Law and Literature: Joining the Class Action, 29 VAL. U. L. REV. 665 (1995).
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(a) law in literature (the depiction of lawyers, judges, and legal
practices in fiction), or
(b) law as literature (the application of theories and techniques
of understanding, borrowed from literary criticism, to legal texts
and activities), or
(c) the law of literature (consideration of the legal norms that
shape and limit literary activity and attitudes), or
(d) law as influenced by literature (examination of the role of
literature in affecting legislation, judicial practice, political
attitudes, and so on).
This list is only suggestive. Categories may be added to it, and these
four categories themselves accommodate indefinitely many agendas
and preoccupations.4
The purpose of all this activity is, if anything, more controversial
than its content. To be sure, it provides employment for defrocked
humanities scholars who have migrated to law schools in recent
decades, and it affords law students a non-narcotic diversion from the
rigors of legal doctrines and the apprehensions of study for the bar.
At the same time, the vast majority of legal academicians persist in
seeing law and literature courses and scholarship as fluff, peripheral
to the enterprise of training lawyers, and therefore dispensable and
unserious. No doubt many law students, lawyers, and judges agree.
And there is also no doubt that equally many "pure" literary scholars
continue to view their interdisciplinary cousins as adulterating the
enterprise of theorizing about literature, as tainting the delicate
dissection of transactions between readers and writers with distracting
references to politics and legal doctrine.
Such skeptics about law and literature, as self-appointed guardians
of traditional borders between the disciplines, may from one point of
view be seen as fighting a war long lost. That, at least, is likely to be
the position of scholars who have grown up without such borders,
scholars who are more at home talking about texts in general than
about legal texts or literary texts in isolation.' The existence of this
very Journal testifies to the viability and centrality of such scholarship.
4. I briefly discuss some of these possibilities in Ethics and Style: The Lesson of Literature
for Law, 45 STAN. L. REV. 497 (1993).
5. Over the last thirty years, the work of such theorists as Roland Barthes and Jacques
Derrida has effected a revolution in the study of language and in our understanding of all
disciplines in which texts play an essential role. Hermeneutics, the study of the retrieval of
meaning, has focussed the attention of legal and literary scholars on problems that their text-
based enterprises have in common. Postmodern scholars are typically preoccupied with the
implications of hermeneutical questions for understanding and communication in general.
Among the most influential texts have been ROLAND BARTHES, ELEMENTS OF SEMIOLOGY
(Annette Layers & Colin Smith trans., 1968); JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY
(Gayatri Chakravorti Spivak trans., 1976); HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD
(Garrett Barden & John Cumming eds. & trans., 1975).
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In this context, "interdisciplinary studies" threatens to become a
misnomer when the disciplines themselves lose their identity and
distinctiveness.
We can distinguish, therefore, three orientations toward such
enterprises as law and literature. The first orientation-represented
no doubt by the significant majority of legal academics, lawyers, and
teachers of literature-presupposes that familiar, historically recog-
nized borders among disciplines remain reliably and unshakeably in
place. Interdisciplinary work is therefore secondary both in concep-
tion and in importance. The second orientation also presupposes that
what we mean by law and by literature has changed little, that for the
most part the study and practice of each discipline is bounded as it
has been for most of the twentieth century. But this orientation is
distinguished by a commitment to the importance of interdisciplinary
work, in particular by the argument that lawyers and law teachers
must accord literature a special place. The third orientation, as we
have seen, is characteristic of those who question the assumed borders
of disciplines and who deploy techniques, such as the deconstruction
of texts and the exploration of hermeneutical insights, that transcend
borders, arguably making them irrelevant. This third orientation
belongs distinctively to postmodern commentators.
The position that Martha Nussbaum takes in her eloquent and
passionate new book, Poetic Justice: The Literary Imagination and
Public Life,6 and the task she sets for herself, clearly reflect the
second orientation. She accepts and adheres to familiar distinctions
between law and literature and illuminates the lessons of the latter for
the former. As her argument progresses, it seems most immediately
addressed to judges. She seeks to show that judicial decisions
informed by "the literary imagination" are likely to be sounder and
wiser than judgments reached by other means. Secondarily, she
argues that legal education and the perspectives of lawyers should
similarly be tempered by literary study.
If the focus of postmodern writers is on understanding and
meaning, the preoccupation of more traditional writers such as
Nussbaum is with morality. In her view, the lessons of literature for
law are unequivocally moral lessons, lessons that are both indispen-
sable for those who claim to do justice and unlikely to be learned in
other ways,7 such as through social interaction.' This impulse and
6. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, POETIC JUSTICE: THE LITERARY IMAGINATION AND PUBLIC
LIFE (1996) [hereinafter POETIC JUSTICE].
7. See infra text accompanying note 14.
8. Nussbaum's concerns echo the notorious debates about relationships between "the two
cultures" (science and the humanities) in the early 1960's. C. P. Snow and F. R. Leavis, as
pointmen in the debates, disagreed about whether science and the humanities define two
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conviction lead Nussbaum to accord training in literature an essential
role in the cultivation of empathy and to accord empathy an essential
role in judging. In the following discussion, I shall fill out the details
of Nussbaum's argument (Part I), examine the implications and limits
of her literary examples and her underlying conception of literature
(Part II), and examine the implications and limits of her conception
of the constraints of law and the role of judges (Part III).
I. LITERATURE AND MORAL IMAGINATION
Poetic Justice is derived from a series of lectures first given in 1991
at Northwestern University Law School and subsequently refined
before other academic audiences. Nussbaum cites her experience
teaching a law and literature course at the University of Chicago Law
School in 1994 as shaping her arguments. Long associated with
Brown University, most recently as University Professor, she is now
professor of ethics at the University of Chicago. Her influential and
well-received earlier books include works on Aristotelian theories of
moral development9 and on the intersection of literature and moral
philosophy.1 °
Two long-standing intellectual commitments are reflected in her
agenda for law and literature. The first is a commitment to
understanding the indispensable role of emotions in judgment, in
particular the role of compassion and mercy in public judgment. The
second is a commitment to the intelligibility of the concept of "quality
of life," and to the defense of transcultural, nonrelativistic standards
for measuring and assessing it.11  What emerges from these
ingredients are "the investigation and principled defense of a
humanistic and multivalued conception of public rationality that is
powerfully exemplified in the common law tradition."12
Poetic Justice is more hortatory than analytical. It defends
unabashedly optimistic conceptions of the emotional potential of
human beings, the power of literature to educe strong, beneficent
emotions, and the capacity for wise, emotionally informed judgment
among persons in general, among lawyers in particular, and even
more particularly among judges. Nussbaum clearly rejects the more
extreme claims of multiculturalists. For her, the relevant moral
separate cultures and whether the humanities naturally have hegemony over the transmission
and refinement of morality. In claiming that role for literature, Nussbaum to some extent
follows Leavis. See F. R. LEAVIS, TWO CULTURES? THE SIGNIFICANCE OF C. P. SNOW (1962);
C. P. SNOW, THE TWO CULTURES AND THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION (1964).
9. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, THE FRAGILITY OF GOODNESS (1986).
10. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LOvE'S KNOWLEDGE (1990).
11. See THE QUALITY OF LIFE (Martha C. Nussbaum & Amartya Sen eds., 1993).
12. POETIC JUSTICE, supra note 6, at xv.
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community is Western culture as it has evolved over recent millenia
rather than the Balkanized subcultures of contemporary cultural
discourse. It is important to look more closely at these features of
her account, and to appreciate the ways in which they challenge the
intellectual fashion, at least as that fashion is represented in the work
of Jacques Derrida, Catherine MacKinnon, and Stanley Fish, rather
than, for example, William Bennett.
1 3
The essential first step of Nussbaum's argument is that persons in
general are morally educable largely because they are emotionally
educable. She is not concerned with self-regarding emotions such as
anger, anxiety, or pride but rather with the emotions that underlie our
perceptions of and transactions with others. Among the latter, certain
emotions, such as envy and fear, inhibit such transactions while
others, such as compassion, facilitate them. In Nussbaum's Aris-
totelian picture of human nature, compassion can be cultivated.
Indeed it must be cultivated if persons are to exercise sensitive and
refined moral judgment. Morality, in turn, is not a Kantian matter of
determining universal rules and their instantiations but rather a matter
of carrying out particularized acts characterized by appropriate
feelings and other-regarding intentions. Compassion in this sense
testifies against the privacy of emotions; it is possible only to the
extent that one person enters into the emotions of another. This kind
of linkage in turn makes possible moral responsiveness.
Nussbaum gives first place to literature in the triggering and
cultivation of compassion (or empathy). At first, this seems odd.
One might assume that compassion is directly evoked by social life
rather than by reading, that our capacity for compassion is tested and
aroused through the implicit demands of others, through observing
and joining their pleasures and pains. Nussbaum thinks otherwise,
apparently for two reasons. First, authors heighten and direct the
opportunities for feeling empathy. Their creative intelligence
concentrates the experience. We are single-minded in our attention
to literature even if we are inattentive in our personal encounters.
Thus, for Nussbaum, the important works of literature are those we
are "held to ... by love and fear" and not merely by "intellectual
exhilaration and rational self-interest." 4  Her second reason for
13. I have in mind Nussbaum's implicit rejection of skepticism about the coherent moral
evolution of Western culture, the kind of skepticism that is exemplified by MacKinnon's self-
styled Marxist analysis of the effects of power and bias on moral consciousness, see CATHERINE
MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1989), and by Fish's suggestion
that moral assumptions depend on the adventitious evolution of interpretive communities, see
STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY (1989). The popular writings of William
Bennett are free of such qualms about power and the relativity of value. See THE BOOK OF
VIRTUES (1994); THE MORAL COMPASS (1995).
14. POETIC JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 30.
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favoring literature over social life as a goad for empathy is that
empathy includes metaphorical thinking, and literature is the main
context in which such thinking flowers. In this sense, reading
literature takes precedence over reading history: "[H]istory simply
shows us 'what happened,' whereas works of literary art show us
'things such as might happen' in a human life."15
Nussbaum has great confidence in the ability of persons in general
and legal decision-makers in particular to engage in metaphorical
thinking, guided by empathy, in their public roles. "[T]his
imagination-including its playfulness, including its eroticism-is the
necessary basis for good government of a country of equal and free
citizens. With it, reason is beneficent, steered by a generous view of
its objects; without its charity, reason is cold and cruel."16  The
implied dichotomy here is sharp. It seems to apply not only to
individuals (those with playful imagination and those without) but also
to particular judgments (those informed by playful imagination and
those informed by cold reason).
This step in her argument merits analysis. On one hand, many will
regard it as transparently (and heartwarmingly) true. Empathy,
guided by playful imagination and guiding reason, is always a good
thing; its absence is always regrettable. Thus, an empathetic decision
is necessarily better than a nonempathetic one. On the other hand,
the step involves easy, too easy, elisions. Does playful imagination
always involve beneficence and generosity-or can the play of
imagination equally well serve cruelty and selfishness? Is analytical
reason always cold and defective, or do many problems of legal
judgment require hard choices? Do such problems often require us to
disregard our empathetic impulses, however regretfully? These
questions implicate Nussbaum's conception of law and the task of
judging and will be considered in Part III.
The premises of Nussbaum's argument represent a qualified
(Aristotelian) form of individualism whereby full development of
individual moral capacities follows a describable course. The
individual who does not use his imagination to enter into the lives of
others, to apprehend both their difference and their accessibility, is
doubly doomed, doomed to a narrow and ungenerous range of
emotions and doomed to moral inadequacy. In other words,
imagination, or what Nussbaum calls "fancy,"17 is the vehicle through
which emotions are cultivated. Moreover, the exercise of fancy
develops not just any emotions but a hierarchy or ordering of
15. Id. at 5.
16. Id. at 43.
17. Id. at 13-52.
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emotions that makes possible responsive, generous, and particularized
actions. Individuals alone are bound to lack such ordered feelings
and are therefore incapable of refined and sophisticated moral
discrimination. Yet, as we have seen, social life itself is for Nussbaum
neither the preferred nor the necessary medium for emotional/moral
flourishing. Rather, literature is imaginative and "playful" par-
ticipation in others' lives, lives that are recreated through the prism
of the author's own imagination and thus transformed into seductive
metaphors. To be sure, a reader who has lived in chaste isolation
from others may not be the ideal beneficiary of literature's lessons,
but Nussbaum says little about how much living is a precondition for
growth through reading. In any event, the community in her version
of communitarianism is one in which persons "connect" through
authors and books.18
Although Nussbaum never describes the emotions that inform
morality or the parameters of moral judgment, the reason is neither
coyness nor relativism. If they are emotions at all, empathy and
compassion are second-order emotions; they are more accurately seen
as modes of being in touch with the emotions, feelings, expectations,
and vulnerabilities of others. What we expect from judges is not the
experience of first-order emotions-such as fear, love, anger,
distress-but the capacity to make morally significant decisions in the
light of empathy with the first-order emotions of others. Moreover,
empathy endows the judge with both closeness to and distance from
others, the closeness of access and the distance required by fairness
and justice. The latter is implicit in recognition by the judge of her
power of decision and appreciation of her separate identity.19
Thus, Nussbaum is not being coy when she declines to specify the
relevant emotions and parameters of judgment. Her position is that,
for the judge who is not compassionate, no amount of argument and
analysis can illuminate what she lacks, and for the compassionate
judge, any attempt to set down and analyze the principles and rules
of judgment will be otiose. Similarly, her argument is not relativistic.
She assumes that compassionate judges, like Tolstoy's happy
families, ° will be more alike than they are unlike. She urges judges
and all moral decision-makers to be "confident in the process that
some reasons are indeed stronger than others, that some ways of
18. Her preoccupation with empathy invites comparison with E. M. Forster's concerns in
presenting his bookish characters and admonishing them (and us) to "only connect." E. M.
FORSTER, HOWARDS END, epigraph (Vintage ed., 1970).
19. POETIC JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 75.
20. "All happy families are alike but an unhappy family is unhappy after its own fashion."
LEO TOLSTOY, ANNA KARENINA 13 (Rosemary Edwards ed. & trans., Penguin Books 1954).
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treating human beings are indeed better than others, and can be
justified as better by the giving of such reasons."21
Such an objectivist commitment can be seen as weak or strong. At
its weakest and most formal, it concedes only that any moral judge
deploys reasons that she regards as stronger than others and that for
any person who claims to make moral judgments it cannot be the case
that all "ways of treating human beings" are morally equivalent. But
Nussbaum's commitment is neither weak nor formal. "[A]s concerned
readers we search for a human good that we are trying to bring about
in and for the human community.... Our search is guided, as well,
by the judgments and responses of our fellow readers, who themselves
are seeking such a comprehensive fit."'22 In other words, Nussbaum
presupposes a broad and universal humanism to which the imaginative
and responsive reading of literature holds a key. Communication
among moral agents, facilitated by literature, will yield such har-
monious and harmonizing insights.'
II. ON LITERATURE AND MORALITY
Compelling as it is, Nussbaum's defense of the role of literature
begs questions about the nature of literature and the nature of law.
I will address questions about literature in this Part and questions
about law in the next Part.
Nussbaum examines three works of literature to illustrate her thesis:
Dickens' Hard Times, Whitman's Song of Myself, and Wright's Native
Son. Dickens receives the lion's share of attention because the
message of Hard Times so clearly inspires and tracks Nussbaum's own
message. In that novel, Dickens satirizes a mode of education, as well
as a mode of thinking, that can variously be described as utilitarian,
behaviorist, or crudely empirical. According to this view, only what
is directly observable and quantifiable counts as an ingredient of
knowledge. Usable knowledge, the only knowledge worth having,
uses hard, not soft, data. The methods of science and not the
methods of what we have come to call the humanities yield true
knowledge and offer a basis for social progress. Thus, the most
fruitful insights, the most exhilarating and effective clearing of
intellectual cobwebs, arise from applying scientific methods to human
affairs.
21. POETIC JuSTIcE, supra note 6, at 83.
22. Id. at 84.
23. Confidence in the harmonizing power of dialogue is, of course, commonplace in
contemporary political theory. The most resonant influence is the work of Jurgen Habermas.
See 1,2 JORGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION (1984, 1987).
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Nussbaum demonstrates that Dickens' withering critique of this
view works on two levels. The novel is not merely didactic and
argumentative but is also written to evoke and exercise the em-
pathetic capacities (the capacity for "fancy") of the reader. In other
words, the novel is itself an example of the kind of education it com-
mends. The same aims, or complementary ones, are achieved,
according to Nussbaum, by Whitman and Wright. Whitman leads us
to compare poets with judges as observers who abjure an "abstract
pseudomathematical vision of human beings" for "a rich and concrete
vision that does justice to human lives." '24 That vision embodies a
"commitment to fairness and fitness [that] does not yield to bias and
favor" but cultivates fairness as neutrality in full recognition of the
"rich historical concreteness" ' of persons.
If this commitment to seeing persons at once empathetically and
neutrally (without bias) is essential for sound judging, and if literature
is essential in showing readers how empathy and neutrality can be
compatible, then "we should seek novels that depict the special
circumstances of groups with whom we live and whom we want to
understand."'26 Wright's Native Son is, for Nussbaum, a paradigm
because it shows "how not only the external circumstances of action,
but also anger, fear, and desire have been deformed by racial hatred
and its institutional expression."'2
Thus, three disparate literary works support the argument that
empathy in fueling imagination is an essential aspect of rational
judgment in human affairs, and a fortiori in legal affairs. As a
statement of humanistic optimism, the argument can hardly be
faulted. Certainly some admirable works of literature can be used
just as Nussbaum describes, and certainly some judges in varied
situations perform their job wisely and benignly when they follow the
methods she outlines.
A serious limitation of Nussbaum's argument, however, is that it
takes a narrow, even a Procrustean, view of literature and its powers.
In this sense, her own account is criticizable on some of the same
grounds on which she disparages the utilitarian, psuedoscientific
perspective of Mr. Gradgrind in Hard Times. Just as there is more to
human nature than is accommodated in his philosophy28 and more
about the complexity and individuality of human experience to be
gleaned from reading than he is prepared to concede, so too
24. POETIC JuSTIcE, supra note 6, at 81.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 93.
27. Id. at 94.
28. "There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, than are dreamt of in your
philosophy." WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 1, sc. 5.
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Nussbaum offers an artificially constricted view of human nature and
the benefits of reading. To be sure, she admits that she is selective,
but she implies that works that do not conform to her thesis are lesser
works, safely ignored: "We all know that many popular works entice
the reader through crude sentiments and the evocation of fantasies
that may involve the dehumanization of others."29 Even if we
shamefacedly put aside and censor from our awareness such works of
apparent near-pornography, much of human nature and its apprehen-
sion through literature is left out of account.
Literature and human nature.
Countless works of literature, from Sophocles through Shakespeare
and Ibsen to Faulkner and Beckett, show how hard it is to attain the
preconditions for empathy and the benign deployment of imagination
and judgment. First of all, as Freud was adept at arguing, our
emotions often operate in the service of denying rather than pursuing
self-knowledge.3" Self-knowledge, a precondition for empathy, is
often painful to achieve and often achieved in a struggle with
emotional predispositions. Even when it is achieved, self-knowledge
can destroy.31 For other personalities, self-knowledge and empathy
can be used for malign ends; Richard III is nothing if not in touch
with the feelings of others, as is every master of manipulation.32
And, often in literature, altruistic motives may serve naivet6.33
Beyond all this, literature often raises the pessimistic question of
whether an imaginative and robust understanding of others in their
complexity is compatible with mutual harmony and toleration or
whether it is an awful and burdensome kind of knowledge that
persons can hardly endure.
Dickens and Wright are special authors in this regard. Dickens has
limited empathy for his characters insofar as few of them are three-
dimensional (or round) and most are two-dimensional (or flat).34
Rather than interacting with each other and demonstrating a capacity
for change, the secondary (flat) players characteristically do star turns,
demonstrating a single exaggerated trait. They are persons as
epithets. The main (round) players are, in the eyes of many readers,
29. POETIC JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 10.
30. See generally SIGMUND FREUD, INTRODUCrORY LECrURES ON PSYCHOANALYSIS (James
Strachey, ed. & trans., Norton 1976).
31. SOPHOCLES, OEDIPUS REX (D.W. Myatt trans., Thurmynd Press 1994); WILLIAM
SHAKESPEARE, KING LEAR.
32. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, RICHARD THE THIRD.
33. HENRIK IBSEN, THE WILD DUCK (1884) reprinted in 6 IBSEN, at 127 (James Walter
McFarlane ed. & trans., Oxford University Press 1960).
34. Generations of critics owe this distinction to E. M. FORSTER, ASPEcTS OF THE NOVEL
(1927).
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insipid and limited, however much they may be empathetic and
benign; they are easily overshadowed by the villains and the ec-
centrics." Wright's characters as well, powerful as they are in
stirring social conscience, are not notable for their complexity and
variety.
Thus, Nussbaum's curriculum for law and literature threatens to
paint an admirably optimistic view of human nature-of the relations
among emotion, rationality, imagination, and judgment-but one that
may be true neither to its inherent Protean complexity nor to the
myriad representations of it in literature.
Literature and politics.
When writers of fiction grapple with law and politics, few find
solace and cause for optimism. Many authors are persuaded that
institutions are corrupt, that law and politics represent facades and
rituals that barely hide, and indeed often facilitate, exploitation.36
Moreover, many believe and argue that the more virtuous a public
official is, the more readily she will be defeated and destroyed.37
Victory for the forces of good is always the exception.
Nussbaum says little about, and has little use for, literature that
shows the complex contexts in which empathetic and rational
judgment must operate. The problem is, of course, more complicated
than the Manichean opposition of the forces of altruism and the
forces of corruption. Many authors see and fear that the processes of
law and politics stultify even more than they corrupt, causing hope
and ambition to wither. In countless ways, literature explores these
contexts. Such literature should arguably be an important part of a
curriculum in law and literature, especially one focussed on the
capacities and opportunities of judges.
Literature and hermeneutics.
Much of Nussbaum's analysis seems to proceed on the assumption
that literary works speak to us univocally. Certainly, Dickens and
Wright hardly suffer from ambiguity, and Nussbaum analyzes
Whitman with the assurance that she has ferreted out his singular
meanings. Of course, she is correct in treating these particular works
35. Compare, for example, Uriah Heep with David Copperfield in CHARLES DICKENS,
DAVID COPPERFIELD (Nina Burgis ed., Oxford University Press 1981) or Fagin with Oliver
Twist in CHARLES DICKENS, OLIVER TWIST (Oxford University Press, 1966).
36. This Rousseauist view of human institutions is displayed in countless novels, plays, and
films. See, e.g., ROBERT PENN WARREN, ALL THE KING'S MEN (1946); LOUIS MALLE,
LACOMBE, LUCIEN (Nouvelles tditions de Films, 1974).
37. See, e.g., HENRIK IBSEN, AN ENEMY OF THE PEOPLE (1882), reprinted in 6 IBSEN, supra
note 33, at 19.
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with little deference to variations in meaning and understanding that
are reader-dependent. The satirical aspects of Hard Times, for
example, are hardly more dependent on the particularities of a
reader's expectations than are the hortatory aspects of a STOP sign.
Yet, the lessons of hermeneutics and theories of deconstruction are
not irrelevant. Many desirable components of a curriculum in law
and literature are works that invite endless debate and support
multiple perspectives. Works by Kafka (The Penal Colony38 , for
example), Melville (Billy Budd, Bartleby the Scrivener9) and Camus
(The Fall) only begin to fill a roster of writers for whom law is an
arena of ambiguity and danger, and judgment is a task full of
challenge and peril, both for the judge and the judged. These
complexities hardly seem to be accommodated at all in Nussbaum's
scheme.
The assumption that novels are primarily didactic and yield moral,
or at least edifying, lessons41 is a premodern assumption, well suited
to the context in which nineteenth-century novels (or novels written
in a nineteenth-century mode) were published. 2 Modernism, in the
hands of such novelists as Joyce, Kafka, Musil, and Faulkner, teaches
us to suspend the assumption that novels mirror moral and epis-
temological characteristics of the "real world" and to understand the
manipulative powers of authors to suspend and surprise realist
expectations. 3  Finally, postmodernism treats the reader's
contribution to the transaction between author and reader as
problematic. By focussing on didactic novels and by presuming to
generalize readers' responses, Nussbaum takes a premodern, if
intuitively seductive, posture toward literature.'
III. ON LAW, INSIGHT, AND EMPATHY
If Nussbaum has a constrained view of literature and its relevance,
38. FRANZ KAFKA, THE PENAL COLONY (Willa and Edwin Muir trans., 1975).
39. HERMAN MELVILLE, BILLY BUDD, SAILOR (Penguin Books, 1986); HERMAN MELVILLE,
Bartleby the Scrivener in THE PORTABLE MELVILLE 45 (Jay Leida ed., 1952).
40. ALBERT CAMUS, THE FALL (Justin O'Brien trans., Knopf 1957).
41. POETIC JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 12.
42. According to many critics, the nineteenth century (and the decades framing it) was the
heyday of the novel, an era in which the novel represented the most familiar and commodious
medium for cultural communication and in which questions of form and content were relatively
unproblematic. The era that begins with Fielding and ends with Lawrence (the era of Dickens
and Eliot, Balzac and Flaubert, Tolstoy and Dostoyevsky) was succeeded by a period of
uncertainty and experimentation during which the terms of novelistic communication came to
be reconceived by each author.
43. The breakdown of realism and a new self-consciousness about form and method are
distinctive features of modernism in art and the theater, of course, as well as in fiction.
44. It seems plausible that this posture and these expectations are shared by most readers
of fiction.
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the same can be said for her view of law. It is, to be sure, churlish
and wrong-headed to quarrel with the idea that empathetic
imagination is more desirable than its absence, and that justice
presupposes judges who understand the lives, needs, and feelings of
those affected by their decisions. It is, however, easy to exaggerate
this warm insight.
Consider Nussbaum's claim that empathetic "imagin-
ation-including its playfulness, including its eroticism-is the
necessary basis for good government of a country of free and equal
citizens. With it, reason is beneficent, steered by a generous view of
its objects; without its charity, reason is cold and cruel."45 Here,
there seem to be two notions, that playful imagination insures
beneficent judging (and law-making) and that generosity should never
be absent from the workings of law. The first and less important
notion posits an ideal that one wishes were true. But, as history,
literature, and personal experience too often show, the links between
imagination and beneficence (or generosity) cannot be assumed.
Nussbaum, drawing inspiration from Aristotle, wants us to join the
two dimensions of empathy, the cognitive and the motivational, to
convince us that to understand others is to be disposed to treat them
altruistically. The claim is attractive in positing an ideal, but the
debate regrettably remains open.
The second notion, about links between generosity and law, leads
Nussbaum to criticize such legal theorists as Herbert Wechsler and
Stanley Fish. Against Wechsler, she emphasizes that neutral
principles in law must always be tempered by "as rich and
comprehensive an understanding as possible of the situation of the
group involved in the case, '46 that one must always see legal
claimants "as individuals with their own stories to tell., 47  She
attacks Fish for arguing that once you "take away extrahistorical
justification ... you do away with all rational justification. You are
left with causes but not good reasons., 48 Nussbaum counters that
the understanding that comes with empathy supplies its own good
reasons, its own ethical justification.
Nussbaum criticizes Wechsler and Fish as too ethereal and seeks to
bring them down to earth, but she performs her own acts of levitation.
Although no one would question that it is highly desirable for judges
to understand the background, circumstances, and feelings of parties
to the case, these facts are not all always relevant, nor do they always
45. POETIC JUSTICE, supra note 11 at 43.
46. Id. at 89-90.
47. Id. at 96.
48. Id. at 84.
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inspire generosity. First of all, one must raise the question,
"Generous to whom?" It is not possible to be generous to both sides
in a case, at least insofar as litigation is a zero-sum game.49
Second, generosity and justice are strange bedfellows. To be just,
on a common understanding of the term, is to give persons what they
deserve; to be generous is to give them more than they deserve.
Justice may require us to curtail or limit our generosity. Moreover,
justice is often depicted as blind-blind, that is, to the individual
characteristics that often appropriately inspire generosity.0
Third, it is an over-familiar but uncomfortable fact that desert
according to moral claims and desert as measured by legal claims are
often different matters. In applying the law, insofar as it is clear and
therefore perhaps inflexible, a judge may be prohibited from being
beneficent.
Finally and most importantly, fully to inhabit the circumstances of
a criminal defendant and listen to the "story" she would tell is almost
certainly to exercise generosity in the direction of forgiveness.
Responsibility according to the criminal law is typically imposed on
those least able to comply because of wholly understandable personal
histories and attitudes. Just as psychiatrists, in their pursuit of
understanding, refrain from blaming and assigning guilt, so too all
empathetic listeners characteristically move from blame to tolerance
to (at least partial) forgiveness. But law exists to enforce respon-
sibility even when it is barely reasonable to expect compliance.
None of this implies that imaginative understanding and generosity
have no place in law, or that it is anything but desirable to have
judges with such dispositions. But the predicament of such judges is
often complex, harsh, and painful. Nussbaum offers too little
discussion of these hard choices.
IV. CONCLUSION
The picture of human nature, of law and judging, and of the
contribution of literature to law that Nussbaum evokes is immensely
attractive. It posits an ideal of harmony and beneficence at many
levels. Literature is a vehicle for cultivating beneficent habits of mind
and heart by which we gain access and insight into the lives of others.
Such habits of mind, through imagination, make possible just and
generous institutions and social relationships of mutual understanding.
At the same time, literature, like other domains of experience, has
endless effects. It may lead us to understand our limits as well as our
49. Perhaps the story of the judgment of Solomon is the exception that proves the rule.
50. I am indebted for this observation to Richard Kay.
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strengths, our capacity for evil as well as for good, our capacity for
insensitivity and confusion as well as for empathy and mutual
transparency. It is possible, and often desirable, to focus on literary
works that cast our common humanity in a positive light. As many
writers know, however, what is common is not necessarily positive and
what is positive is not necessarily common.
Literature teaches many kinds of lessons. Nussbaum's argument is
compelling when she stresses the importance for judges of an
informed and imaginative understanding of how lives are affected by
their reasoned judgment. Her argument is less compelling, or at least
less clear, when it presumes to tell us what lessons literature yields
and how those lessons may inform justice. If the ideal of empathetic
justice and the arguments articulating it are more tentative than
Nussbaum admits, the ideal is still a venerated one worth reasserting
on the cusp of the new millenium.
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The law and literature project1 continues to expand in two direc-
tions. First, some scholars pursue the detailed study of specific texts
and authors for the light they shed on the nature of law and its impact
on our lives. Second, some engage in the systematic introspection
required for the application of critical theory-to both fiction about
legal issues and to the interpretation of legal texts as a form of
literature-in an attempt to make a place for the law and literature
movement within, or as a continuation of, modern and postmodern
intellectual history.' Daniel Kornstein's Kill All the Lawyers? reflects
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1. Law and literature is a project that is most easily defined as a process of reading and
comparing literary and legal texts for the insights each provides into the other, and whose
combined force illuminates our understanding of ourselves and our society. See Bruce L.
Rockwood, Introduction: On Doing Law and Literature, in LAW AND LITERATURE
PERSPECTIVES 19 (Bruce L. Rockwood ed., 1996). As James Boyd White has noted, "[Il]iterature
and law are both about reason and emotion, politics and aesthetics ... " JAMES BOYD WHITE,
Law and Literature: "No Manifesto," 39 MERCER L. REV. 739, 751 (1988).
2. For a nice discussion of the relationship of text and theory, see David Bevington,
Reconstructing Shakespeare, U. CHI. MAG., Spring 1990, at 21.
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the first trend, and Ian Ward's collection of essays, Law and
Literature, combines both approaches, seeking to frame its textual
analysis within an overview of several schools of critical theory. Each
approach has its strengths and weaknesses, and while each of these
excellent new books contributes to the development of the field, each
also shows the limitations of an analysis that puts too much emphasis
on a single approach. The "good" in the title of this Review reflects
their focus on classical and modern texts that demonstrate to lawyers
and lay readers alike how well literature and literary theory can
illuminate the place of law in society. What is arguably "bad" is
Kornstein's inability to focus on a few major themes, leaving the
reader overwhelmed by detail, and Ward's recurrent reliance on
tightly summarized theoretical arguments of others, overburdening the
reader anxious to get to the heart of the literary text and its
implications for our understanding of law. The "ironic" can be seen
in many of the characterizations of lawyers and the law in both
books-starting with Kornstein's title and including Ward's detailed
discussion of Johnathan Swift's view of the law-and in the narrative
methods deployed in the texts they examine.3 Irony is also apparent
in Ward's clearly expressed doubts about the point of all the theory
he has so thoroughly explicated.4
Daniel Kornstein, a practicing attorney and president of the Law
and Humanities Institute, has written widely over the past decade on
Shakespeare's treatment of law, and his lessons for contemporary
attorneys, in articles published in the New York Law Journal and
numerous law reviews. His book reflects many years of reflection on
his chosen subject, incorporated now into a treatment of "those
[plays] that seemed most useful and fertile for the theme of
Shakespeare and the law."5 While "only an amateur" when it comes
to Shakespeare, he makes a convincing case that "[clulture has been
delegated too much to the experts": Those who love Shakespeare,
particularly attorneys who combine their legal training and experience
with close reading of Shakespeare, independent study of scholarship
in the field, and their own experience of his plays, can "draw new
connections, and open new perspectives, not only on the plays, but
also on notions of law."6  By implication-and by example
-Kornstein does just that, and in a way that encourages a similar
response in his audience. He addresses a reading public interested in
3. IAN WARD, LAW AND LrMRATURE: PossmILmES AND PERSPECrIVES 112-16 (1995).
See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 105-11 (discussing Ward's treatment of Atwood).
4. See, e.g., WARD, supra note 3, at 56. After all is said and done, perhaps Ward felt he had
to discuss the theory so that no one else need do it again!
5. DANIEL J. KORNSTEIN, KILL ALL THE LAWYERS? SHAKESPEARE'S LEGAL APPEAL at
xvii (1994).
6. Id. at xiv.
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the law and-he hopes-inclined to accept that his approach will aid
its understanding of both the law and Shakespeare's plays and their
implications for our times.
In contrast, Ian Ward, senior lecturer in the Centre for Legal
Studies at the University of Sussex in England, is an established
scholar with long experience in teaching and writing for an academic
audience. He shares Kornstein's enthusiasm for his subject-"I want
this book to be enjoyable. It certainly has been to write" 7 -and
emphasizes the study of texts:
I have introduced some of the dominant themes in contemporary
literary theory, [but] I have tried to do so to the minimum extent,
and only insofar as necessity dictates. What I have wanted to
avoid is to write yet another book on the alleged merits and
demerits of the various 'isms' which have entered the literary
legal vocabulary. This is a book about literature and about text,
not about theory. My discussions of the roles of the author and
the reader and the text . . . exist simply to strengthen the case for
returning to the text.... They are all important to varying
degrees, but I have no idea what the extent of this variance is,
and neither, I suspect, does anyone else.'
Nevertheless, Ward's approach is initially highly theoretical. His first
three chapters summarize the emergence of the law and literature
movement through a comprehensive synopsis of the ideas of many
contributors to the field, and his subsequent essays on specific literary
texts contain substantial chunks of theoretical exegesis as well. In
short, Ward says he wishes to focus on texts and the educational value
of the law and literature movement, but envelops text in theory to a
great extent.
Since Kornstein's approach to Shakespeare is almost entirely
atheoretical, while paying close attention to the texts he examines in
much the same way as Ward, I will examine Kill All the Lawyers?
first, explore how Ward covers some of the same ground in his
treatment of Shakespeare, and then consider Ward's exegesis of other
texts. Both books invite a wider readership into the law and
literature community, while both show that steps still need to be
taken to accomplish that expansion, a concern I will address in my
conclusion.
7. WARD, supra note 3, at ix.
8. Id. at x.
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I
Kornstein indicates from the outset that his purpose is not to
provide a systematic or comprehensive treatment of all legal aspects
of Shakespeare's plays, but simply
to identify some major legal themes in Shakespeare, some not
previously discussed, and their modern relevance and implications
in an attempt to engage current moral and social issues. My
objective is to find ... those theatrical moments that most affect
our legal thoughts today, that establish that Shakespeare still
speaks to us about some of the legal questions that matter most
to us today-which on examination always prove variants of age-
old human problems.... My approach is free of ideology and
school of thought.9
Kornstein begins his book with a striking synopsis of the plot of
The Merchant of Venice, written as a law student might write the
factual summary in a brief of a commercial law case. It is a compel-
ling synopsis, at once so unexpected and so familiar, and shows how
deep the roots of Shakespeare are in our imagination and our cultural
heritage. ° He then proceeds to give a brief overview of the law and
literature movement, focusing on the debate between Judge Richard
Posner and Richard H. Weisberg over the value of the interdis-
ciplinary study of law and literature."1 Knowing that both scholars
are members of the Law and Humanities Institute, it appears that
Kornstein is here trying to provide a broader context for his book,
while persuading Judge Posner to continue to play the game, and
perhaps even come around to seeing law and literature as something
more than an intramural form of light relief from his more serious
work in law and economics.12 Kornstein also briefly acknowledges
the contributions of James Boyd White and Robert Ferguson to the
field, and cites examples of numerous writer-lawyers on both sides of
the Atlantic who have forged links between law and literature in their
9. KORNSTEIN, supra note 5, at xvi.
10. Id. at 3-4. Only later does Kornstein address and ultimately reject the claims that the
play is anti-Semitic and therefore ought not to be produced or seen. Id. at 85-86. See generally
JOHN GROSS, SHYLOCK: A LEGEND AND ITS LEGACY (1992); Bruce L. Rockwood, Shylock the
Stranger, in THE EYES OF JUSTICE 251 (R. Kevelson ed., 1994).
11. KORNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 5-11. Richard Posner, well known for his many writings in
the field of law and economics, first entered the law and literature debate in response to
criticisms of his economic analysis by Robin West, who drew parallels between Posner and the
world portrayed by Franz Kafka. See generally ROBIN WEST, NARRATIVE, AUTHORITY, AND
LAW (1993). Richard H. Weisberg invited Posner to think again, praising Posner for implicitly
recognizing the importance of the law and literature canon in his use of "criticism that is text-
centered" and "has a wealth of bibliographical data for all levels of its readership." RICHARD
H. WEISBERG, POETHICS AND OTHER STRATEGIES OF LAW AND LITERATURE 188-90 (1992).




own lives and works.1 3 He then briefly reviews what is known of the
biography of Shakespeare, and the place of law in his experience and
in the life of Elizabethan England. 4 He concludes this introduction
with the observation that Shakespeare may have sought to influence
the lawyers and judges of his day in the direction of law reform. He
observes that "[i]nterpreting Shakespeare is in some ways like
interpreting the Constitution"-whether by reference to author's
intent, or as a continuing conversation as each generation reinterprets
Shakespeare for itself.15
Chapters Two through Thirteen of Kornstein's book each address
a particular play with the same basic methodology: an outline of the
plot that is tied into one or more contemporary legal issues and
referenced to recent trials and court decisions. To give a sense of the
kinds of arguments Kornstein makes, the evidence he provides, and
the persuasiveness with which he makes his case, I examine several of
those chapters here.
In Chapter Two, Kornstein dissects the origins of the famous and
often invoked phrase, "The first thing we do, let's kill all the lawyers"
from Henry VI, Part 2.16 He describes lawyer bashing from Dickens
to Bierce in literature, and to Spielberg's 1991 film, Hook, in the
popular cinema. 7 But Kornstein shows that Shakespeare, unlike
Swift, was sympathetic to law and lawyers, and recognized the need
for lawful authority in society. The character who says "kill all the
lawyers" is Dick the Butcher, responding to Jack Cade, who has been
manipulated into leading a rebellion and calling for a utopia where
"[a]ll the realm shall be in common."'" This class revolt naturally
attacks lawyers as symbols of hated authority and oppression of the
poor. Lawyers are high on the "enemies list" because of their
importance to the preservation of the status quo.1 9  Taking us
through several layers of meaning, Kornstein draws a parallel to
13. KORNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 9-11.
14. Id. at 11-21. His historical and biographical information is largely based on W. NICHOLAS
KNIGHT, SHAKESPEARE'S HIDDEN LIFE: SHAKESPEARE AT THE LAW, 1585-1595 (1973).
15. KORNSTEN, supra note 5, at 20. He cites an exchange about Shakespeare between
Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Harry Blackmun in Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelso
Disposal, 492 U.S. 257, 290 (1989), in order to show the continuing vitality of Shakespeare and
his value in understanding the nature of interpretation.
16. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE SECOND PART OF KING HENRY THE SIXTH act 4, sc. 2,
1. 78 (Stanley Wells & Gary Taylor eds., Oxford Shakespeare ed., Oxford University Press 1988)
[hereinafter HENRY VI, PART 2].
17. KORNSTEN, supra note 5, at 22-23; cf. id. at 33-34 (discussing attacks on lawyers by
Marlin Fitzwater and George Bush). He misses the classic quotation from Swift noted by Ward,
that lawyers are a "society of men among us, bred up from their youth in the art of proving by
words multiplied for the purpose, that white is black, and black is white, according as they are
paid." WARD, supra note 3, at 115.
18. HENRY VI, PART 2, supra note 16, at act 4, sc. 2, I1. 70-74.
19. KORNSTEN, supra note 5, at 25-26.
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Shay's rebellion in the United States in 1786, in which debt-ridden
farmers in western Massachusetts attacked lawyers as "being in league
with eastern creditors." 20 On this level of meaning, one can read
Shakespeare as intending Dick the Butcher's call to be taken literally
and with approval by at least some in the audience. But on another
level, Dick's cry can be seen as a "compliment to lawyers," as Justice
John Paul Stevens argued when he said that Dick the Butcher was "a
rebel, not a friend of liberty," adding that "Shakespeare insightfully
realized that disposing of lawyers is a step in the direction of a
totalitarian form of government., 21 Of course, Kornstein points out,
"we should not go overboard in praising lawyers for opposing
revolutions," citing many lawyers who have supported revolutions:
Robespierre, Danton, the signers of our Declaration of Independence,
and even Fidel Castro.22
On balance, Kornstein argues, Shakespeare is ambiguous about his
attitude here as in so many things. He has "the plucking of the red
and white roses in the fourth scene of the second act of Henry VI,
Part I [occur in] the Garden of Middle Temple, one of the Inns of
Court," suggesting a sympathetic view of lawyers. "Why choose a
lawyer's haven," Kornstein queries, "if the Bard thought so little of
lawyers?"'  His references to the killing of judges and lawyers in
Henry VI, Part 2 may merely follow Holinshed's Chronicles, a
compilation first published in 1587 and thus available to Shakespeare
as a source.24 The violence attributed to Cade, Kornstein argues,
also reflects the violence of a legal system that hangs the poor
because they cannot read.' Finally, looking at the perversion of the
law that destroys Humphrey, Duke of Gloucester, lord protector
during the minority of Henry VI, Kornstein suggests:
Perhaps the sequence of events culminating in Gloucester's death
means the death of law and the triumph of chaos and disorder.
20. Id. at 27. He mentions Harold Laski's comment that lawyers are always liquidated first
in revolutions, without giving a precise citation for the reference. This is a fairly common
practice of Kornstein's, and reflects his apparent belief that some ideas are common knowledge
of which the reader can take "judicial notice," which can be inconvenient for readers looking
for further information.
21. Id. at 28 (quoting Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 371
n.24 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
22. Id. at 29.
23. The notion that this reference shows sympathy to lawyers is unclear. The setting may
simply reflect the fact that the scene involved a legal issue, that is, the issue of who had the best
claim to be the legitimate heir to the throne. The scene symbolically marks the beginning of the
Wars of the Roses, as Shakespeare's Richard Plantagenet proposes a silent test: He asks his
supporters to pluck a White Rose, which became the symbol of the House of York, while
Somerset plucks a Red Rose, which became the symbol -of the House of Lancaster. Asimov
suggests the garden was simply a private place to avoid being overheard when discussing what
might be called treason. ISAAC ASIMOV, 2 ASiMOV'S GUIDE TO SHAKESPEARE 545, 548 (1993).
24. KORNsTEuN, supra note 5, at 29.
25. HENRY Vt, PART 2, supra note 16, at act 4, sc. 7, I1. 38-42.
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It is at this point, and not before, that the commons rise up in
anger. By fairly administering the law, by acting as a tribune of
the people, Gloucester had 'won the commons' hearts'....
Cade's mob emerges only at the moment of Gloucester's death.
They did not criticize the law before then. The people are com-
pelled, through lack of a lawgiver, through the total breakdown
of the constitutional rule of order, to take the law into their own
hands. They do not protest all law, but only perverted, false
law .... As symbols of the evil legal system, lawyers become the
object of hatred.26
Both Shakespeare and Kornstein leave us guessing about the meaning
of the famous lines from Henry VI, Part 2, although the symbolism of
a revolt occuring after the murder of Gloucester suggests where their
sympathies lie: with the position that where lawyers no longer serve
a public ideal of the law, the public will no longer respect or value
them.
In his subsequent analysis of Measure for Measure, Kornstein
explores the utility and fairness of using positive law to enforce
morality, particularly when private violations of law have gone
unchecked for years. If such laws are not enforced, will not all
respect for law wither away, and society decay as a result? But if such
laws are strictly interpreted and harshly enforced, will this not also
engender disrespect for lawful authority? Shakespeare explores these
issues in the context of a law imposing the death sentence for
fornication. Kornstein applies the principles debated in Shakespeare's
Vienna to consider the implications of the Supreme Court's narrow
decision to uphold the Georgia statute criminalizing homosexual
sodomy in Bowers v. Hardwick.' Discussing the 1957 Wolfenden
Report to Parliament,' which called for decriminalizing homosexual
practices between consenting adults in England, and the attack on it
in 1958 by Lord Devlin" on grounds that sound much like those
raised by "family values" advocates today, Kornstein uses the events
and dialogue in Measure for Measure to question the logic of Lord
Devlin, and the Bowers Court. Kornstein doubts there is any "way
to distinguish between an imminent actual threat [to the survival of
society] and mere public disapproval," and questions whether (as
Devlin claims) "a society is entitled to protect itself against a change
in social institutions," particularly "at the cost of human freedom."3
26. KORNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 32-33 (citation omitted).
27. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
28. KORNSTEiN, supra note 5, at 38 (citing Report of the Committee on Homosexual
Offenses and Prostitution).
29. LORD DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1958).
30. KORNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 39.
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Citing anti-abortion violence and the controversy over remarks made
at the 1992 Republican National Convention, Kornstein suggests that
the advocacy of using laws to enforce morality is increasing. The
increasing role of the Christian Coalition and similar groups in
pressuring political parties to regulate morals, recent calls for punitive
welfare reform, and the enactment of the Communications Decency
Act, all suggest that the movement for increased public regulation of
private morality has not yet reached its peak. Contemporary society
is faced with the potential for abuse of power reflected in the role of
Angelo in Measure for Measure.
In his explication of Measure for Measure, Kornstein defends the
reasoning of Justice Blackmun's dissent in Bowers, and after sum-
marizing Robert Bork's argument that "we legislate little else" than
morality, asks how we are to determine "which moral convictions
should be transformed into law, that is, which of the various moral
principles held by people in a pluralist society command (and should
command) sufficient support to become enforceable through coercive
power of the state. '' 31 Measure for Measure takes a clear position in
this debate, coming "down against laws seeking to enforce private
morality."32  Kornstein uses the play to explore privacy doctrine,
public respect for the law, and the relevance of the Roman law
concept of desuetude-the notion that a law has been nullified
through disuse-as means of justifying non-enforcement of obsolete
laws that remain on the books, whether for reasons of laziness or
political cowardice.33 The threatened death sentence for Claudio,
Kornstein argues, would raise Eighth Amendment questions concer-
ning cruel and unusual punishment in our society, as would, Justice
Lewis Powell suggested,' any prison sentence which Georgia might
have imposed had the state actually sought to enforce its law against
Michael Hardwick.3 ' He concludes by arguing that the most sig-
nificant lesson of the play is its modem approach to the problem of
legal interpretation and judging:
By eschewing extremes, Shakespeare comes up with a theory of
moderation that blends law and discretion, and all that those two
concepts mean, into a workable system of legal interpretation.
... [L]aw should be enforced, but in moderation.... Formal
31. Id. at 40-41.
32. Id. at 42.
33. Id. at 47.
34. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 198 (Powell, J., concurring).
35. In addition to these issues, the ambiguity of advocating mercy while relying on the rule
of law, the problem of the abuse of power, and the not-so-modern problem of sexual
harassment, are also raised in the play and subjected to Kornstein's scrutiny. KORNSTEIN, supra
note 5, at 43-58.
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laws may have unjust results unless tempered by equity; rigid
interpretation of formal rules is fraught with risk.
Kornstein also discusses The Merchant of Venice and Richard II,
both plays that have been the subject of extensive analysis by other
writers in law and literature. The Merchant of Venice has been
explicated by Richard H. Weisberg to emphasize the play's portrayal
of the failure of mediation and the importance of keeping promises:
The brilliance of the play's conclusion lies in the subtle ascendan-
cy of ethics over comedy, of law over equity, of oaths over
breaches, of commitment over mediation.... To put it epis-
temologically, Jewish commitment finally prevails over Christian
mediation in The Merchant of Venice. ... To put it legally, law
conquers equity, and the covenant regains its ascendancy.'
Kornstein compares The Merchant of Venice to Measure for Measure,
exploring the tension in both between law and equity, finding major
differences between the two plays, and giving a subtle variation on
Weisberg's analysis.3" Kornstein comments on the two plays:
Portia's resemblance [in Merchant if Venice] to Isabella [in
Measure for Measure] ... goes only so far. Although Portia
delivers a great speech about mercy, she does not act mercifully.
Isabella, in contrast, does match act to word; she is liberated
from her passion for revenge to a feeling of sympathy. Likewise,
Shylock's personality [in Merchant of Venice] remains what it has
always been (avaricious and vengeful), while Angelo [in Measure
for Measure] had to be introduced to evil. Finally, and perhaps
most vital of all, The Merchant of Venice differs ... in
underscoring a basic legal counterprinciple: strict adherence to
formal rules is often necessary to do justice, especially for an
outsider.39
This analysis, coming so closely on the heels of his comments on the
importance of tempering rules with equity as shown in Measure for
Measure, may initially raise some doubts: Is Kornstein simply listing
whatever legal principles seem to appear in a scene or speech, without
any concern for consistency, or is he articulating the apparent
36. Id. at 58-62.
37. WEISBERG, supra note 11, at xi, 101-03 (1992). In Peter J. Alscher, Staging Directions
for a Balanced Resolution to The Merchant of Venice, 5 CARDOZO STUD. L. & Lrr. 1 (1993),
this interpretation is highlighted. There are staging directions to bring out this aspect of the play,
and related discussions.
38. Weisberg puts great emphasis on the failures of "Christian mediation" and the value of
personal responsibility for one's own oaths and promises, while Kornstein is focusing on the
spirit with which rules of either law or equity are applied. Compare WEISBERG, supra note 11,
at 93-104 with KoRNsTEtN, supra note 5, at 63-65, 76-77.
39. KORNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 65, 72-77, 82-83.
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inconsistencies in Shakespeare? On reflection, it is clear that the
juxtaposition is telling, and the synthesis apparent. Law and equity are
both tools in the hands of any jurist, and whether they are used for
good or ill turns on something more than principle; it turns on the
spirit with which they are exercised: with sympathy by Isabella, with
rigidity by Angelo, and with self-interest by Portia.'
Richard II, which Kornstein scrutinizes later in the book, has been
the subject of extensive meditations by both Ian Ward and James
Boyd White, one of the founders of the modem law and literature
movement.41 White shows how the play provides a series of conflic-
ting voices "answering each other in the shifting contexts that the
conversation defines as it proceeds," as Shakespeare explores the
proper constitutional basis of authority in an England which is
gradually moving from a Medieval to a Modern world view. White
notes that "each of the speeches also performs its own method of
thought and expression, for which it necessarily claims a kind of
authority as well, as indeed Shakespeare does for the play itself."42
Exploring the rhetorical images used in the play to characterize the
"crown," White argues that Shakespeare "works on the principle that
the truth cannot be said in any single speech or language," but must
emerge in our observation of these competing voices and the impact
of their interaction.43 After a close textual exegesis of the major
speeches in the play, White concludes by tying the play into his
rhetorical view of the nature of law:
At the end of the play we are left in the modem world, in which
it is most unclear what can count as a ground upon which one
person can have power over another, and why. In this sense,
Richard II can be read as having invented ... the problem of
authority to which our constitutional discourse has ever after
been directed .... For after the deposition there is no king, but
only a man in power. There is no language in which he (or we)
can satisfactorily describe his situation, or explain or justify his
power.... The most we can hope to do is what Shakespeare
does, to develop one way of talking as far as we can, then poise
it against another; that is where the truth lies, in the relation
40. Angelo and Portia both see the error of their ways in the final scenes of their respective
plays. Portia's mediation in Act IV serves to protect her own financial interests, and leads her
to enforce the law selectively and to refrain from exercising the mercy she later bestows on the
errant Gratiano and Bassanio. As Weisberg grudgingly admits: "Of course, Portia and Nerissa
are about to forgive their husbands ...." WEISBERO, supra note 11, at 102.
41. WARD, supra note 3, at 59-89; JAMES BOYD WHITE, AcTs OF HOPE: CREATING
AUTHORITY IN LITERATURE, LAW, AND POLITIcs 47-81 (1994).
42. WHITE, supra note 41, at 47-48.
43. Id. at 49-50.
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between languages .... They fit together, not in a logical but in
a poetic or rhetorical order, to tell a story."
In contrast, Ward employs Richard II, together with Richard III and
King John, to make his case that exploring legal history through the
method of law and literature is less politically controversial than some
other ambitions of law and literature scholars, and will attract the
widest possible audience to the educational possibilities of the
movement.45 Ward's case study, unlike White's, is not part of a
series of interconnected essays working toward a common thematic
conclusion, but more like the sequential study of texts found in
Kornstein's book.46 Ward explores the competing constitutional
theories of "mixed" and "absolute" monarchy, and the parallel
philosophies of government-"providentialism and humanism"
-reflected in this discourse.47 Shakespeare, Ward argues, shows a
grudging support of an "orthodox providential theme" in Richard Iff:
By unambiguously describing God's vengeance upon an equally
unambiguously evil and insufficient Richard, Shakespeare was
able to negate the need for anyone else to remove him. There
is no need for rebellion, at least not a self-determined rebellion.
This perhaps is the central constitutional message of Richard
111.48
By the time he came to write the later Richard II, Shakespeare had
"committed himself to a thoroughly anti-absolutist stance in
constitutional thinking," rejecting the "medieval world of Gaunt." He
was beginning to doubt early Tudor doctrines of "providence and
divine right." The play reveals
Shakespeare's growing sympathy with a position more akin to
that taken by the English humanists, and to the type of mixed
monarchy to which Queen Elizabeth herself subscribed; absolute
to a degree, but subject to the common law of the realm, and
limited by the common law determination of kingship.49
Ward thinks Richard II conveys uncertainty, yet is rooted in an
orthodox mixed-monarchy tradition that does not leave England quite
as rootless and dependent upon competing stories as in White's
44. Id. at 74-77.
45. WARD, supra note 3, at 59.
46. Ward gives a more thorough review of the history of the Tudor Constitution than either
White or Kornstein. WARD, supra note 3, at 61-64. White addresses some of these issues in his
essay on Richard Hooker. WHITE, supra note 41, at 82-123.
47. WARD, supra note 3, at 62.
48. Id. at 71.
49. Id. at 88.
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telling, unless we impose upon it our knowledge of the revolutions
shortly to come.
Kornstein takes a completely different tack to Richard II, using it
to comment upon a variety of contemporary legal issues and themes
from the perspective of an American trial attorney. The initial scene
of trial by combat is viewed as a commentary on the origins of the
right to confrontation in our adversarial system of justice. The
problem of judicial bias is explored through an examination of
Richard's own interest in the outcome of the dispute, which is
compared to the bias of King Leontes serving as judge and prosecutor
in The Winter's Tale.5" In exploring the constitutional dilemma of
leaders who violate the law, Kornstein draws parallels between the
Iran-Contra crisis and the Duke of York's initial refusal to join
Bolingbroke's rebellion: "I am loath to break our country's laws."" t
Would that our elected or appointed officials, our Oliver Norths,
followed York's example and similarly pause. Oliver North and
the other Iran-Contra figures should read Richard II. They
would profit by it. Richard's own conduct is a precedent. He
finds pretexts for seizing and confiscating the estate of
Bolingbroke's father. What kind of law does a lawful king or
government represent that resorts to illegal financing for special
projects? Or that resorts to means that are technically legal but
morally wrong?52
The constitutional crisis facing Richard II-is the king above the
law?-is seen by Kornstein to parallel the crisis that faced another
Richard, President Richard Nixon, after the 1974 Nixon Tapes
Case.53 Kornstein, in a similar vein to Ward, comments:
Somewhere between the divine right of kings, at one extreme,
and the man on a white horse, at the other, lies a happier, more
moderate form of government. Here is where Shakespeare's
political philosophy squints toward constitutional democracy...
[H]e compares governing to gardening, with a gardener saying,
"All must be even in our government.
5 4
Kornstein sees the pardon Bolingbroke gives to the traitor
Aumerle55 as a point of departure for a discourse on President
Carter's pardon of draft resisters, and President Bush's more
50. KoRNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 194-96.
51. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING RICHARD It, act 2, sc. 3, I. 168 (Stanley Wells & Gary
Taylor eds., Oxford Shakespeare ed., Oxford University Press 1988) [hereinafter RICHARD II].
52. KoRNsTEN, supra note 5, at 198.
53. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 708 (1974).
54. KoRNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 198-199 (quoting RICHARD II, supra note 51, at act 3, sc.
4, 1. 37).
55. RICHARD II, supra note ?, at act 5, sc. 3, 11. 111-16.
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constitutionally doubtful pardon of six Iran-Contra defendants. 5 6
And where Ward and White see a struggle between medieval and
modern visions of government, Kornstein examines the discourse on
inheritance and the law "of wills" in the play, and sees "modern
notions of meritocracy at war with a thin-blooded, weak, and
undeserving heir." 7
After analyzing thirteen plays in depth, and with references to
many others, in Chapter Fourteen, Kornstein evaluates the claim that
Shakespeare actually worked as an attorney or legal clerk, which he
sees as unproved. His concluding epilogue argues that although
Shakespeare "had no overall theory of law,""8 he has had, and
continues to have, a profound impact on the law. From his perspec-
tive as a trial lawyer he cites such often emulated examples of
Shakespearean rhetoric as Antony's funeral oration in Julius
Caesar,59 arguing: "The lawyer who understands why Antony's
funeral speech succeeds while Brutus's fails understands the value and
the core meaning of oral advocacy."'  Kornstein argues that
Shakespeare's plays demonstrate the "relationship of law to human
nature," including "the need to balance law and discretion" and the
"relationship of law and morals."61  Contemporary attitudes of
hostility and distrust towards lawyers and judges are mirrored in the
plays, along with examples of such "honorable lawyers as Humphrey
in Henry VI, Part 2, and the lord chief justice in both parts of Henry
IV.' ' 62 Numerous commentators have written of possible direct
impacts of Shakespeare's plays on the law of his era, and he has been
cited and quoted in hundreds of American state and federal judicial
opinions, in part because he has written "on so many sides of so many
topics" that he can be cited for almost any proposition in the law.63
As Antonio noted in The Merchant of Venice, "The devil can site
Scripture for his purpose"; Kornstein concludes this is true of
56. KORNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 200-02.
57. Id. at 207.
58. Id. at 239.
59. Id. at 107-24, 240. Kornstein devotes an entire chapter to Julius Caesar, and explicates
Antony's famous oration from its beginning, "I come to bury Caesar, not to praise him," through
its climax: "Mischief, thou art afoot. Take thou what course thou wilt." Id. at 110-12 (quoting
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS CAESAR act 2, sc. 2, !1. 75, 253-54 (Stanley Wells & Gary
Taylor eds., Oxford Shakespeare ed., Oxford University Press 1988)).
60. Id. at 240.
61. Id. Revenge, defamation, what it means to "think like a lawyer," the nature of
constitutional government, equity, equality, and due process are also addressed in Shakespeare.
62. Id. at 241.
63. Kornstein observes that former Solicitor General Charles Fried, recently confirmed to
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, used Shakespeare's Sonnet LXV arguing for reliance
on written texts to support our ability to understand the intentions of the Framers when they
wrote the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 243-44 (citing Charles Fried, Sonnet LXV and the 'Black Ink'
of the Framers' Intentions, 100 HARV. L. REV. 751 (1987)).
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Shakespeare, as well.' This does not trivialize Shakespeare, in
Kornstein's view, but merely reflects the close affinities between his
law-saturated era and our own, particularly in the similarities between
the instability of the Tudor dynasty and the Elizabethan religious
settlement and our own era of Constitutional debate and social and
political uncertainty. Kornstein concludes that "Shakespeare
legislated for the future with his plays more than those who draft
constitutions, enact statutes, and judge cases.... At long last we can
acknowledge Shakespeare as one of our greatest lawgivers."65 This
may have been intended to be a major thesis of the book, and it is
supported by much of the detail provided,' but the point should
have been brought out with greater clarity initially, rather than
presented with the appearance of an afterthought.
Kornstein's is the distinctive voice of an American lawyer; his
reading is not as analytic as White's or Ward's, but his well-crafted
plot summaries and the numerous connections he draws between
Shakespeare's world and our own make this a valuable book. It will
inspire attorneys and law professors alike to think more about the
value of using Shakespeare at the bar and in the classroom. Written
in a way that is accessible to teachers and students, it could inspire a
further renaissance in appreciation of the Bard. The writing is
disjointed in places, sometimes his comments appear inconsistent, and
the book may not appeal to the theoretically minded, but, on its own
terms, it is a great success.
II
Ian Ward's Law and Literature: Possibilities and Perspectives, makes
a significant contribution in the two distinct ways suggested by its
subtitle. First, his first chapter provides a useful and thorough
overview of the theoretical work that has been done in law and
literature. Ward conveys the gist of the central arguments, and
enables a reader new to law and literature quickly to get to the heart
of the major perspectives on the field. Throughout the rest of the
book, Ward likewise summarizes and applies much contemporary
theory that bears on law and literature, thus giving the reader a
context for understanding the significance of the field. Second, by his
64. Id. at 241-42 (quoting WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE act. 1, Sc.
3, 1. 97 (Stanley Wells and Gary Taylor eds., Oxford Shakespeare ed., Oxford University Press
1988)).
65. Id. at 245.
66. Kornstein argues, for example, that Shakespeare wrote Measure for Measure in 1604 to
show the new King, James I, "how to govern in view of English jurisprudence, precedent, and
case law." Id. at 62-63.
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judicious selection and explication of texts, Ward gives the reader a
true sense of the myriad possibilities of law and literature.
Ward lets you know which literary figures he thinks matter, and
contributes to widening the perspectives brought to the field by his
references to Native American, Islamic, and Jewish law, which, he
points out, are all "constructed around a series of metaphors and
parables. '' 67  In reviewing the contribution of Robin West to the
field, from her initial critique of Richard Posner's law and economics
analysis to her more recent arguments, Ward claims that "[a]lthough
she concludes by suggesting that there is a place in critical legal
scholarship for a literary supplement, West's recent work is clearly
less sympathetic to law and literature. Her ambitions are more
political, less textual., 68
I am not sure I agree that West's ambitions are decreasingly
textual, given the importance West continues to place on the
educative value of literary texts, 69 one of Ward's own main objectives
for the field.7" Is he suggesting that her political concerns must
make her less sympathetic to law and literature? Or is it that the law
and literature movement as he defines it does not include her
methods? For reasons that are not clear, given his choice of texts to
critique later in the volume, Ward appears to worry that the political
edge of some law and literature scholarship is risky,7" yet at the same
time he faults critical legal studies (CLS) scholars for not making
more use of literary texts and narrative methods than they do:
67. WARD, supra note 3, at 5.
68. Id. at 11. See also id. at 22 ("For some, such as Robin West, literature is only of value
insofar as it can help to reveal the politics of law .... ").
69. See WEST, supra note 11, at 9-14. She sees literature as a crucial tool in moral and
political discourse, and does not disparage it for the sake of her political analysis, as shown in
her essay Economic Man and Literary Woman, in id. at 251-63. Cf. L.H. LaRue, West on Story
and Theory, 92 MICH. L REV. 1786 (1994).
70. Ward's Preface reveals his belief that too often
learning 'the' law is like eating sawdust. The law grinds down its supplicants.... Literature,
on the other hand, can be fun. It hopes to please.... One of the themes of this book is
that an appreciation of law and literature can better educate lawyers and, indeed, non-
lawyers, precisely because it is fresh and enjoyable, whilst at the same time it is capable of
broadening the learning experience.
Ward, supra note 3, at ix. He later argues for concentrating on "the educative ambition of law
and literature," noting that "unlike many other theoretical approaches to the problems of law,
law and literature wants to better educate." Id. at 23. Ward applies this educative goal not only
to law students and teachers, but to the public, including especially children and young people,
for whom law and literature may be the only training in the questions of law and justice at the
heart of legal study. Id. at 23-27, 116-18.
71. See WARD, supra note 3, at 22-23 (arguing that West and Richard Weisberg "are dancing
around the edge of the volcano," and that while law and literature "to have any point at all,
must be prepared to flirt" with politics, the movement "should not, however, permit itself to be
seduced").
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Yet in general, despite much debate by CLS adherents on the
possibilities of alternative discourse, relatively little has been
done. Any political or social ambitions which might be har-
boured in literary texts have been extracted and employed by law
and literature scholars rather than by critical legal scholars.
72
Ward seems here to be engaging in a process of labeling certain
scholars as primarily law and literature scholars, and others as critical
legal scholars, without completely accepting the natural overlap
between the fields that make such distinctions artificial and imper-
manent at best.73 And he makes no mention of critical race theory
as an offshoot of the CLS movement, even though this is a field of
critical scholarship where narrative methods-the telling of stories,
parables, and autobiographical narratives-are widely used.74 In my
view, the law and literature movement is a broad field which
encompasses some of what those whom Ward writes about as
practitioners of CLS do, but is not limited to that or any other
theoretical school. Thus, Ward is correct in giving his priority to
texts, since for law and literature to be effective as a legitimate and
independent source of understanding, law and literature cannot say in
advance whether any particular political outcome or theory will
emerge from the analysis of the text: "[T]he political manifesto is
supposed to emerge from the educational force of the literature," as
he puts it.75 Ward concludes this overview with a reaffirmation of
the "educative potential" of law and literature and an assertion that
the two kinds of law and literature distinguished by Posner-"'law as
and law is' literature '76-are "indistinguishable in text use.177
In Chapter Two, Ward discusses the theoretical debate over the
"death of the author" first suggested in 1968 by the French
semiotician Roland Barthes. 71 Ward argues to the contrary that "in
72. Id. at 11.
73. He appears to accept the overlap implicitly in the diversity of his subsequent choices of
authors and scholars to discuss in Chapters Two and Three, including critical theorists, law and
literature scholars, and novelists, such as Roland Barthes, Ronald Dworkin, Terry Eagleton,
Umberto Eco, Stanley Fish, Michel Foucault, E.D. Hirsch, Marcel Proust, Edward Said, Jean-
Paul Sartre, and Mark Twain. The possibilities inherent in linking literature and theory are well
displayed in TERRY EAGLETON, SAINTS AND SCHOLARS (1987), a fantasy that reinforces the
view that irony plays a fundamental part in understanding law and literature.
74. He refers to Patricia Williams, but not Derrick Bell or Kimberle Williams Crenshaw. He
has a brief bibliographical reference to Richard Delgado, but ignores Delgado's fictional Rodrigo
dialogues, see, e.g., RICHARD DELGADO, THE RODRIGO CHRONICLES (1995), and thus omits
from his analysis the implications of a large body of work that fits within law and literature,
CLS, and critical race theory. See generally GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS
167-85 (1995).
75. WARD, supra note 3, at 23.
76. Id. at 12-13.
77. Id.
78. ROLAND BARTHES, The Death of the Author, reprinted in ROLAND BARTHES, THE
RUSTLE OF LANGUAGE 54 (1986).
Rockwood
law and literature scholarship there is perhaps a case for reintroducing
the author, if not in the interpretive enterprise at least in the
pragmatics of text use."79 His thorough and largely dispassionate
review of the debate over the proper role of text, author, and reader
makes the case for "reintroducing the author" to facilitate "the use of
literature in legal study," illustrating the value of such a move in the
context of three distinct discourses that are identifiable by their
"author-function.""0 The first of these discourses are stories by legal
theorists, written for a legal audience; he cites Maimonides, Francis
Bacon, and Thomas More as examples. The second is literature
"written to describe and comment upon law and society," such as
works by Charles Dickens, Nathaniel Hawthorne, Jane Austin,
Thomas Hardy, and, in this century, Mordechai Richler. Also in this
category are texts addressing racism-such as works of Mark Twain
and Alice Walker-and various examples of children's and feminist
literature,"1 which he examines in depth later in the book. The third
discourse is "literature which uses law to describe something else."
Here Ward cites Dostoevsky, Camus, and Kafka, who use "the legal
situation" to portray "the alienation of the human condition." 2 He
concludes that what he characterizes as the "pragmatic political
ambition" of law and literature requires it to return to the author
since, Richard Rorty has argued, it is the author who creates the pos-
sibilities opened up by all three discourses.'
In his third chapter, Ward examines the "cases" of hermeneutics
and deconstruction, asking the question, "Is there a given meaning to
any text? Or is there just a meaning generated by a particular
reader?"'  He summarizes the complete failure of understanding
revealed in the famous "Gadamer-Derrida encounter":
By following Heidegger's lead, both Gadamer and Derrida deny
the possibility of a transcendental language-free idea of human
understanding.... [T]he difference between them is... one of
degree. For Gadamer, hermeneutics preserves the possibility of
unity of meaning. Although a text might give off a multitude of
possible meanings, the intersubjective relationships of text and
79. WARD, supra note 3, at 28, 34.
80. Id. at 28.
81. Id. at 35-38.
82. Id. at 34-38.
83. Id. at 40-41 (commenting on RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY
(1989)). Ward remarks: "If we are to use literature to understand the situation of our fellow
(wo)man,. . . we will need to understand the role of the author behind the texts.... Rorty
expressly approves the assertion made by Hirsch that the use of a text requires knowledge of
the author .... Rorty is keen to align himself with the pervasive belief that the text itself cannot
reveal an authorial intent, merely, at most, its own." Id. at 41.
84. Id. at 43.
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reader, and of reader and reader, create a bounded or
'constrained' meaning for every text. Thus a community of
readers can share a meaning .... For the deconstructionist,
however, like Derrida... texts are radically indeterminate,
defying the possibility of ever being securely constrained by any
circumstance. 85
Ward shows how this debate informs law and literature through the
works of Stanley Fish, Owen Fiss, Ronald Dworkin, Mark Tushnet,
Robin West, Allan Hutchinson, James Boyd White, Richard Weis-
berg, and others.86 He has done the reader a great service in this
summary, and at the same time established the foundation for his
focus on texts in Parts Two and Three of his book. He ends the
chapter with a reference to the work of Drucilla Cornell, and the
ironic commentary:
By turning to Cornell we are returning to Derrida, and thus once
again . . . to a certain extent coming full circle. There is ul-
timately no resolution to this debate. These are not 'cases' that
can be won or lost. They are simply arguments and counter-
arguments. Is there a meaning to this text, this chapter? Well, I
hope so but, if not, how will I ever know, so why should I worry
about it? It is you, not me, who really matters, and you, as
reader, must reach your own conclusions.87
In Part Two, Ward claims to have moved away from theory, to
have "consciously sought to discuss literature, 88 itself-from
Shakespeare to children's literature to several feminist novels, and the
themes of responsibility in "modern literature" by Kafka and
Camus.89 In Part Three, he presents detailed case studies of two
contemporary works, Ivan Klfma's Judge on Trial' and Umberto
Eco's The Name of the Rose.91  These final studies and his
examinations of Shakespeare and children's literature focus on the
details of the text and their lessons for understanding the nature of
law. However, his chapters on feminist literature and responsibility
include a significant exegesis of contemporary critical theory, which
may help or hinder the reader in grappling with the texts then
addressed, depending on one's point of view. I will now turn to these
"textual" chapters.
85. Id. at 43-44.
86. Id at 43-56.
87. Id. at 56.
88. Id at x.
89. 1d at 142.
90. IVAN KLIMA, JUDGE ON TRIAL (Chatto & Windus 1991) (1986).
91. UMBERTO Eco, THE NAME OF THE ROSE (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 1983) (1980).
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Following his study of English legal history as revealed by three of
Shakespeare's plays,92 Ward makes his most significant contribution
to the law and literature field through a long-overdue and extended
discourse on the value and use of children's literature to legal
education, with detailed examinations of several well-known texts.
This chapter alone is worth the price of the book, and should be
brought to the attention of both professors in schools of education
and teachers working in the field. He discusses the difficulty of deter-
mining how to label a work "children's literature," concluding that
"the common position now is to determine children's literature by its
audience, and by audience use."'93 He explores the relationship of
the psychological theories of Nicholas Thicker and Jean Piaget to
understanding the relationship of children and texts.94 It is mar-
velous to find the insight that Beatrix Potter's The Tale of Ginger and
Pickles is "truer to life" than Posner's Economic Analysis of Law.95
His use of The Flopsy Bunnies as an example of Potter's simple and
clear moral lessons is sound, but he has the facts wrong: The little
bunnies do not get into trouble as a result of stealing from the garden.
Rather, they eat overgrown lettuces thrown out among the grass
clippings in the rubbish heap, fall asleep, and are found by Mr.
McGregor.9 6  The moral there, in my view, is the insight into the
risks involved in having too many children without being able to feed
or watch over them.
Other children's texts addressed include the works of Lewis Carroll
and Mark Twain, Rudyard Kipling's Jungle Books, William Golding's
Lord of the Flies, and Jonathan Swift's Gulliver's Travels.97 Ward
highlights the fact that very few people study law after secondary
school, and that the lifetime impressions of law, equity, justice, and
fairness of most citizens are formed by the jurisprudence of children's
literature: "If legal language is, to use Foucault's phrase, a 'specialized
92. See infra text accompanying notes 45-49.
93. WARD, supra note 3, at 91.
94. Id. at 93-98.
95. Id. at 101.
96. BEATRIX POTTER, THE TALE OF THE FLOPSY BUNNIES 10-33 (1909). The story also
teaches the virtues of good neighborliness and gratitude, as the bunnies are rescued by Mrs.
Thomasina Tittlemouse, who is given at "next Christmas ... a present of enough rabbit-wool
to make herself a cloak and a hood, and a handsome muff and a pair of warm mittens." Id. at
37-38, 59.
97. Id. at 101-16. Other works that also deal with legal or political issues include JOHN
REYNOLDS GARDINER, STONE Fox (1988) (oppressive taxation, welfare, Native American
rights); ELEANOR HARDER, DARIUS & THE DOZER BULL (1971) (self-government,
environmental law); DR. SEuss, THE LORAX (1971) (environmental law); SALMAN RUSHDIE,
HAROUN AND THE SEA OF STORIES (1990) (censorship and political corruption); DR. SEUSS,
YERTLE THE TURTLE AND OTHER STORIES (1950) (totalitarianism). See also Bruce L.
Rockwood, Face to Face: Law and Other Stories, in FLUX, COMPLEXITY, AND ILLUSION 351,
355-58 (Roberta Kevelson ed., 1993).
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knowledge,' then literature and especially children's literature, can
serve to de-specialize it, and for that it should be treasured. 98
Ward next discusses feminist theory as it applies to law and
literature, explaining the distinction between the "Anglo-American
position" (which emphasizes the "socio-political nature of literature")
and the "French position" (which concentrates "on the construction
of feminist texts as texts" and "perceive[s] the woman as a form of
writing").99 He presents the reader with a sound introduction to the
diverse writing in this field, and then focuses on the "rape discourse"
reflected in the work of Catherine MacKinnon and Susan Estrich, and
its application in such novels as Margaret Atwood's The Handmaid's
Tale and Andrea Dworkin's Mercy."° Ward writes of the total
degradation of Atwood's protagonist, Offred:
The essential question that Atwood is posing is whether there is
ever any choice for the woman, and if not whether every sexual
event is rape or, of course, that no sexual event is ever rape.
Language offers itself as a partial . . . escape for Offred: "One
detaches oneself. One describes." This is a common theme in
feminist descriptions of rape. Thus, in the same vein, by
refusing to engage the event, these descriptions attempt to
preserve some possession of the body.t I
Ward's decision to focus on the rape discourse theme in Atwood's
novel fails to acknowledge the book's proper placement in the
broader literature of anti-utopias, science fiction, and satire. Atwood
is not necessarily or merely writing about the oppression of women
in general, but about the oppression of women in a near-future
religious fundamentalist state which might arise if Congress were to
enact the social agenda of the extreme Right and the "Christian
coalition," while repealing all environmental laws. Rape plays a
central role in the metaphor of the novel because of what Ward ack-
nowledges as the "semiotics of rape," its definition "as a sexual act
effected by power."" 2 But the broader theme of the novel is the
isolation and loss of control that anyone must feel who has no power
over his or her own life. 3 This theme is underscored by Offred's
final words in the novel (which bear a striking similarity to the
98. WARD, supra note 3, at 118.
99. Id. at 119-28. "Thus, while the [French theorists] want feminist writing to unsettle, the
[Anglo-American theorists] want women in the public arena and in the constitutional courts."
Id. at 119.
100. Id. at 128-38 (discussing MARGARET ATWOOD, THE HANDMAID'S TALE (1986), and
ANDREA DWORKIN, MERCY (1991)).
101. WARD, supra note 3, at 133.
102. Id. at 130.
103. In showing a world which might be, if we extrapolate from these contemporary political
and social trends, Atwood is paralleling the exploration of censorship in RAY BRADBURY,
FARENHEIT 451 (1953).
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sensibility reflected in the concluding paragraphs of George Orwell's
19840):
The van waits in the driveway, its double doors stand open. The
two of them, one on either side now, take me by my elbows to
help me in. Whether this is my end or a new beginning I have
no way of knowing: I have given myself over into the hands of
strangers, because it can't be helped. And so I step up, into the
darkness within; or else the light.1 5
Atwood prefaces the novel with epigraphs from the Bible and
Swift's "A Modest Proposal," and ends with an Appendix-a parody
of an anthropological report, "Historical Notes on The Handmaid's
Tale" -highlighting both the satirical impulse and the science
fiction technique. Read in the context of other works of that
genre,1°7 the novel can still be seen to raise the questions Ward
highlights, without risking the slide into the political volcano for which
he earlier faults Robin West and Richard Weisberg"~, but now
seems to court, as when he concludes this discussion by asking: "Is
Gilead different from contemporary North America? Certainly the
discourse of sexuality is no different, and neither, therefore, is the
discourse of rape.""
Ward's reading of Atwood seems to conflate her work with the
more extreme views of Andrea Dworkin's crie du coeur, Mercy, the
second novel he analyzes in this section. "[M]any of the themes of
Mercy are those which can be found in The Handmaid's Tale.... In
Dworkin's opinion, every sexual act is ultimately a rape and,
moreover, male presence is a continual threat of rape.' ' n  This
raises an interesting question: Does he choose to present Mercy as a
text because of its educational value, in spite of its approach to "rape
from an overtly political position?" '' l Or does he call Mercy
"political" as a cue that we are not to take it seriously, because of his
earlier warnings against taking the law and literature movement in too
political a direction? In either case, Dworkin's angry narrative and
104. Winston is being shot as he sits gazing up at the telescreen, yet "[hie had won the
victory over himself. He loved Big Brother." GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 245 (1949). While
Atwood's ending appears more hopeful, Offred is likewise giving herself up to unknown forces,
and has no control over her future. And Orwell ends his novel with an Appendix, "The
Principles of Newspeak," to which Atwood's anthropological Appendix may be an implied
homage.
105. ATWOOD, supra note 100, at 378.
106. l& at 379-95.
107. See, e.g., ALDOuS HUXLEY, BRAvE NEW WORLD (Harper and Row 1969) (1932);
FREDERIK POHL, THE YEARS OF THE CITY (1984).
108. See supra note 71.
109. WARD, supra note 3, at 136.
110. Id. at 136-37.
111. Id. at 138.
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"uncompromising demand for overt political action against men" is
not likely to be widely read, and even less likely to be accepted by a
broad audience. Rather than furthering the educational objectives of
the law and literature movement, the events and arguments in Mercy
will likely offend or discourage so many readers that even any
underlying truths it has to say will not be taken seriously. For
example, in his semiotic analysis of Andrea Dworkin's hardly original
message that "the true nature of rape [is] power not sexuality,"112
Ward really shows that her novel hijacks a truth that has been better
explored by others (including Atwood) in a manner that is more likely
to reach a wide audience."3 Thus, in his examination of these two
texts, Ward shows both the power of law and literature discourse, and
the risks that it entails as it seeks to expand awareness of outsider
stories without losing its audience."1 4
In Chapter Seven of Law and Literature, Ward applies himself with
vigor, intermixing theory with text in a clear and dispassionate style.
His exegesis of Kafka's The Trial and Camus's The Stranger is
compelling. 15 He draws a parallel between the concept of respon-
sibility in modern literature as examined in these two literary works,
and the "themes... [of] alienation and responsibility [which are] at
the conceptual core of much ... contemporary critical legal scholar-
ship."'1 6 He discusses Richard Weisberg's use of Camus "as
representative of Nietzchian ressentiment,"'17 and the influence of
Kant, Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Habermas, Marcuse, and Foucault on
the subsequent evolution of Critical Legal Studies, political
philosophy, and "the narrative fictions of such writers as Kafka and
112. Id.
113. Andrea Dworkin has her defenders, who have created their own interesting and illum-
inating web site: http'/www.igc.apc.org/womensnet/dworkin/-which takes as its epigraph a
quotation from Gloria Steinem: "In every century, there are a handful of writers who help the
human race to evolve. Andrea is one of them." This cite includes a section called "The Lie
Detector," which lists statements often made about her writings and beliefs, and explanations
as to whether they are true, false, or half-truths. "The Lie Detector" restates her opposition to
rape, battery, prostitution, and pornography. See generally Edward de Grazia, Sex de Jure, THE
NATION, Feb. 20, 1995, at 242; Martha Middleton, Anti-Porn Legal Theorists Gather in Chicago,
NATIONAL L. J., Mar. 22, 1993, at 7; Carlin Romano, Between the Motion and the Act, THE
NATION, Nov. 15, 1993, at 563; Jeffrey Toobin, X-Rated, THE NEW YORKER, Oct. 3, 1994, at 70;
Cathy Young, The Sexist Violence Against Women Act, WALL ST. J., Mar. 23 1994, at A15.
114. The solution to the problem of reaching a wider audience to address the challenges of
sexism and racism in society may lie in Ward's earlier discourse on children's literature. We
shape (and possibly change) our world by how we educate our young, what we read to them,
what television programs and commercials we show them. The gentle use of didactic children's
literature may have more power to prevent sexual misunderstanding than a dozen novels like
MERCY. See, e.g., STAN & JAN BERENSTAIN, THE BERENSTAIN BEARS: NO GIRLS ALLOWED
(1986) (Sister Bear teaches Brother Bear and his friends that his "boys only" club is unfair).
115. WARD, supra note 3, at 142-45, 154; see also id. at 204-05, in the book's conclusion.
Ward refers throughout to Camus's novel The Stranger by its English title, The Outsider.
116. Id. at 151.
117. Id. at 142.
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Camus.""'  Ward's reliance on Heidegger's political thought as
somehow central to modern critical theory is surely
overdrawn-Heidegger was one of many, such as Schopenhauer,
Bergson, and Nietzsche, who contributed to the continental strand of
philosophical inquiry that sought to understand humanity's place in
the universe in an era marked by scientific advancement, religious
doubt, and revolutionary uncertainty.1 9 Ward states:
Heidegger's own insistence that "philosophy" was "dead," and
that the future of thought lay in exploring the intersection
between disciplines such as politics, psychology and most
especially language, has also become something of a keystone in
twentieth-century critical theory. It is of course the belief that
guides such interdisciplinary work as law and literature. Heideg-
ger and Heideggerians such as Derrida, Arendt or Marcuse have
advocated precisely the "cross-disciplinary" study, or "Ciceronian
unity," which law and literature scholars such as James Boyd
White have advocated.12°
Arguing that Heidegger is responsible for interdisciplinary studies, law
and literature, and the ideas of James Boyd White is rather like
taking the position that the Communist Party's advocacy of civil rights
in the 1930's was responsible for the civil rights movement, the work
of the NAACP, and Martin Luther King, Jr.-a claim of post hoc,
ergo propter hoc that cannot be taken seriously.21  Far too much of
this chapter is spent on theory that has little or nothing to do with law
and literature, and it only serves to detract attention from Ward's
concise discourse on Camus and Kafka, and his earlier claims to be
dedicated to the text and the author. Perhaps Ward felt it was
necessary to put his textual exegesis into this elaborate theoretical
context, following the model of Weisberg,'2 but the net effect is to
create the impression that Ward is attempting to piggy-back a major
role for Heidegger onto the new and vibrant law and literature
118. Id. at 154; see also id. at 169 (discussing connection between Kant and the objective of
reestablishing a "philosophy of ethics at the heart of a new legal order in central Europe").
119. Ward's characterization of the Nazi period in Heidegger's life as a mere "political
flirtation" comes across as weak apologetics, regardless of Heidegger's presumed "vast"
influence. Id. at 146. He gives a curiously uncritical treatment of Heidegger's questionable
desire to become the "spiritual Fthrer of National Socialism." Id. at 146-48 (discussing 1933
address by Heidegger at Freiburg University).
120. Id. at 149. Ward may be following Richard Weisberg's emphasis on Heidegger. See
Richard Weisberg, Text into Theory: A Literary Approach to the Constitution, 20 GA. L. REV.
939 (1986).
121. Advocates of Marxism, Christian Neo-Catholicism (Jacques Maritain), Hegelianism,
Conservative Humanism (Matthew Arnold, Irving Babbitt), and Romanticism have all at various
times advocated interdisciplinary studies and are equally available as sources for the
interdisciplinary impulses of law and literature. My thanks to M.A.R. Habib for this insight.
122. RICHARD WEISBERG, THE FAILURE OF THE WORD (1984).
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movement, which is better off without Heidegger's theoretical
complexities and the taint of Heidegger's refusal to abandon "the
political ideal of National Socialism."'"
Ward concludes his book with extended discourses on two wonder-
ful contemporary novels, Ivan Klima's Judge on Trial and Umberto
Eco's The Name of the Rose. Each essay contains a detailed synopsis
and analysis of the text under consideration and a clear connection to
the theme of the previous chapter that "[t]he history of the human
condition, as critical legal theorists repeatedly emphasize, is a history
of the failure to take responsibility.""2 4 Each novel receives a
thorough exegesis that shows how the introduction of exciting new
texts can contribute to the success of law and literature as a method
that educates and inspires. In exploring Judge on Trial, for example,
Ward shows how the protagonist of the novel, Adam, a judge who
survived the Nazi occupation and then grew disillusioned with the
Communist regime he served, returns to Czechoslovakia as "a final
act of self-assertion," spurred by the recognition that he needs to take
responsibility and to develop "a different philosophy of law and
life." Ward notes: "When Adam returns to the Prague of 1969, he
finds the freedom which can regenerate both the community and
himself."126
Implicit in Ward's choice of two new Continental novels as the
focal point for the conclusion of his book is the clear message that the
possibilities of law and literature are truly international and multicul-
tural, not restricted to the classical literary canon as taught in Anglo-
American universities. Law and literature as a movement continues
searching for new stories and retelling old ones, and these two novels
are only some of the many possibilities Ward wishes us to consider.
One objective of this search for new stories is to provide the basis for
building a new global community of tolerance and mutual respect in
the coming century. Ward frames this objective as one of helping us
make the existential decision to choose "as Camus's heroes ....
Kafka's Joseph K. and Dostoevsky's Raskolnikov" learned to choose,
"not between truth and falsehood, but between happiness and
unhappiness." 27 Stories told, taught, and studied in the law and
literature enterprise may do that, as Ward suggests, and they may do
123. Ward, supra note 3, at 148.
124. Id. at 166.
125. Id. at 168.
126. Id. at 170. Ward argues that Klima's novel is a clear example of what Richard H.
Weisberg "suggests is the ultimate ambition of law and literature scholarship; the use of literary
texts to discover an ethical basis which can transcend the alienated condition." Id. at 168 (citing
WEISBERG, supra note 11, at 46).
127. WARD, supra note 3, at 204 (discussing the lessons Brother William learns in Eco's The
Name of the Rose).
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more, as they help the reading community come to a higher level of
understanding of the human condition, and a closer approximation of
what truth, as well as happiness, might be.
III
Daniel J. Kornstein's Kill All The Lawyers? speaks to our era in the
polished cadences of an experienced advocate, who is as much at
home in the courtroom as in the world of Shakespeare. He shows the
continued value of classic literary texts in illuminating contemporary
legal problems and issues. He also shows that Shakespeare's plays are
fun to read," 8 and may inspire more young people (as well as
lawyers and professors) to read them. He lacks a coherent theory, yet
Shakespeare himself in all his diversity may be the cause of that: The
Bard cannot be pinned down.129 In contrast, Ian Ward's Law and
Literature: Possibilities and Perspectives serves by its method as a
model for the use of texts as a primary vehicle for doing law and
literature, while using a variety of theoretical approaches as a source
of ideas that may help the reader read, but can never supplant the
fundamental personal encounter with the text in the search for
understanding. Ward's dedication of three entire chapters to
primarily theoretical considerations, and the similar theoretical
baggage attendant on his text-focused essays, suggests one drawback
of the scholarly interest in law and literature, the danger of submer-
ging some fairly simple and basic insights in a sea of academic glosses
that only serve to obscure novel, play, story, or poem from its
audience. 3°
Both books will be of value to law school and college professors,
graduate students, and students of legal studies and literature who
wish to learn about the law and literature movement. Ward's
chapters on theory may discourage some readers, while Kornstein's
lack of an overall theory may make his book seem chaotic as he leaps
from topic to topic and insight to insight. Future teachers of high
school English would benefit from exposure to both books, particular-
ly if they were inspired to adopt new approaches to teaching texts that
forced students to go beyond Cliffs Notes and think about the relation
of law and literature to the violent, uncivil, and intolerant society that
128. This is one of the main selling points in the movement to incorporate literary studies
into the political science curriculum. Catherine H. Zuckert, Why Political Scientists Study Fiction,
CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 8, 1996, at A48.
129. Consider Posner's analysis of the range of attitudes towards revenge portrayed in
Shakespeare's plays. POSNER, supra note 12, at 62-63.
130. It was easy getting my ten-year-old son to read Tom Sawyer this summer by giving him
a paperback copy about the same size as a Bruce Coville or Goosebumps story and letting him
take it down to the water to read, without treating it as a classic or attaching any literary glosses.
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faces them every day in and out of school. Overall, the lesson of
these two books is that law and literature is a catholic discipline, a
"big tent" that encompasses many tendencies, but is still undergoing
some growing pains. To help law and literature find its voice, reach
a wider public, and achieve its communitarian potential, 131 law and
literature scholars need to find a synthesis between Kornstein's text-
driven enthusiasm and Ward's theoretically meticulous approach.
Law and literature scholars need to reach out beyond the boundaries
of academia and inspire a new generation of readers in the virtues of
our constant and constantly changing civic culture. In this way they
can translate what is good and useful in their ideas and approaches
into a language that can reach and move the widest possible audience.
Law and literature must combine a commitment to teaching with a
renaissance in the spirit of the public intellectual if it is to achieve its
full potential.
131. See generally WHITE, supra note 41.
Copying, Culture, and Control: Chinese
Intellectual Property Law in Historical
Context
William P. Alford, To Steal a Book is an Elegant Offense: Intellectual
Property Law in Chinese Civilization. Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1995. Pp. ix, 222. $39.50.
Jonathan Ocko*
[O]nly if we have some understanding of why in Chinese civilization
it has been an elegant offense to steal a book will China and its
foreign friends know how in the future to discern and protect one
another's legitimate interests.
William Alford'
Few people are as well-suited as William Alford to provide this
understanding. Now Henry L. Stimson Professor of Law and Director
of East Asian Legal Studies at Harvard, Alford studied Chinese
history at Yale Graduate School and law at Harvard, then practiced
international law before returning to academia. Like his mentors,
Jonathan Spence at Yale and Jerome Cohen at Harvard, Afford is
adept at producing work that engages and stimulates both China
scholars and non-specialists. The book at hand is no exception.
Though relatively short in length, it is a rich, pioneering study that
sets forth two distinct but closely related arguments. The first, which
makes up the core of the book, explains by reference to China's
* Jonathan Ocko is Professor of History at North Carolina State University and Adjunct
Professor of Legal History at Duke University School of Law, where he teaches courses on
Chinese legal history and on law and society in contemporary China. His current research
comprises projects on the concepts of justice in late imperial China, the concept of contract in
Chinese culture, and mediation in Chinese culture. He would like to thank David Lange of
Duke School of Law and William Jones of Washington University School of Law for being
patient sounding boards.
1. WILLIAM P. ALFORD, To STEAL A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT OFFENSE: INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW IN CHINESE CIVILIZATION 123 (1995).
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political culture why "intellectual property law, and in particular
copyright, has never taken hold in China."2 The second, which builds
on the first and constitutes the conclusion, seeks to convince
American policy makers and diplomats that without "further political
liberalization and a greater concomitant commitment [by the Chinese]
to the institutions, personnel, interests and values needed to undergird
a rights-based legality, detailed refinements in intellectual property
doctrine itself will be of limited value."3 Thus, Alford argues, as
difficult as it is for one nation to influence "the enduring values and
practices central to [another] nation's identity,"4 the United States
ought nonetheless to attempt to nurture a new, more rights-oriented
political culture in China.
Afford's persuasive plea for a values-driven China policy may strike
some readers as ironic in light of Alford's reminder at the outset of
this study that, in studying legal developments in China, we should
not assume that our own course of history is necessarily "normal" or
inevitable.5 However, his teleological argument is devoid of the
tendentiousness that might weaken its cogency. Alford's work traces
the story of how an enduring, paternalistic, authoritarian Chinese
political culture, embodied successively by the commitments of
imperial, republican, and socialist states to controlling both the flow
and content of information for the purpose of sustaining state power,
has impeded the development of intellectual property rights.
This argument is at the heart of each of the four basic propositions
the book advances. First, imperial China had no serious indigenous
counterpart to Western conceptions of intellectual property because
of the character of its political culture. Second, late imperial reforms
in the area of intellectual property proved fruitless because the
reformers failed to consider whether the Western models they
invoked were relevant for China and assumed that foreign pressure
would lead to adoption of and adherence to these norms. Third, the
current attempts to establish intellectual property law in China,
"especially the mainland," have failed because they have overlooked
the difficulty of reconciling Western "legal values, institutions, and
2. Id. at 1. Alford uses the term political culture in a general way, without offering his own
specific working definition. Id. at 119. For a brief discussion of how the concept has been
recently employed by others in Chinese studies, see Elizabeth J. Perry, Introduction to POPULAR
PROTEST & POLITICAL CULTURE IN MODERN CHINA 1, 4-6, 10-11 (Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom &
Elizabeth J. Perry eds., 2d ed. 1994).
3. ALFORD, supra note 1, at 120. Alford uses political culture here in the same way it is
employed by Elizabeth Perry. According to Perry, a political culture approach sees change in
a culture as "inevitably" drawing "heavily on established cultural repertoires." Perry, supra note
2, at 5.
4. ALFORD, supra note 1, at 120.
5. Id. at 4.
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forms" with the constraints of China's past and present circumstan-
ces. Fourth, despite intellectual property being a central objective of
American "diplomatic leverage," the resulting bilateral agreements
have not accomplished their intended goals because of American
misunderstanding of legal developments in the mainland and
Taiwan.6
These propositions are developed in the book's five topical
chapters, which I summarize in Part I of this Review. In Part II, I
suggest questions that need attention in future research on intellectual
property in China.
I
In Chapter Two, "Don't Stop Thinking About... Yesterday: Why
There was No Indigenous Counterpart to Intellectual Property in
Imperial China," Alford touches briefly on trademark, and barely at
all on patent, before moving to a nuanced discussion of copyright. He
finds that Douglass North's theory of scientific and technological
innovation leading to a heightened concern with property rights7 did
not apply to China, except perhaps when the state sought to prevent
certain technologies and trades from being transferred to peoples
outside China who might threaten the empire. And, though the state
would sometimes assist guilds and individuals in their efforts to
protect trade names and marks, it was concerned less with demar-
cating and enforcing intellectual property rights than with preserving
social order by preventing fraud. However, while Alford ac-
knowledges that "economic and technological factors should not be
ignored" in explaining "why the imperial Chinese state did not
provide systematic protection for the fruits of innovation and
creation," he locates the principal cause in the political culture of
imperial China, particularly "the constitutive role" of a "shared and
still vital past.",
8
As the source of truth, the past validated and legitimated. Poets,
painters, and scholars took part in a process of "transformative
engagement" with the past. Through the study and mastery of the
contents of the Confucian Classics, the citation of which was the "very
method of universal speech,"9 scholars prepared for the civil service
examinations. And just as the state attempted to control publication
6. Id. at 2-3.
7. Id. at 133 n.2. North argues that new opportunities for profit lead to the creation of new
legal institutions, which, in turn, determine the long-term success or failure of a society's
economy. See DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE (1990).
8. ALFORD, supra note 1, at 19.
9. The phrase is the late Joseph Levenson's. See id. at 26 n.111.
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of materials such as calendars, almanacs, and witchcraft manuals that
could be used to challenge its monopoly on ordering the relationship
between man and the heavens, ° so the state also proscribed the
printing of unauthorized versions of the Classics and unapproved
examination preparation materials. In the "interests of fairness and
the maintenance of [social] harmony,"'" the state might intervene to
protect a monopoly over a mark or trade name, but Afford cogently
asserts, "the need to interact with the past sharply curtailed the extent
to which it was proper for anyone other than persons acting in a
fiducial capacity to restrict access to its expressions."' 2 In sum, the
intellectual property constituted by the common heritage of the past
in general, and the enduring social truths of Confucianism in
particular, belonged to the state.
Since the general reader may be unfamiliar with Confucianism, it
is perhaps appropriate to digress here to offer an explanation.
"Confucianism," explains one of its contemporary practitioners and
best scholars, "is a worldview, a social ethic, a political ideology, a
scholarly tradition, and a way of life."13 Although Afford does not
provide an integrated explanation of Confucianism, he touches on
nearly all of these elements while emphasizing the fit between the
social ethic and political ideology. For Afford, as for many of us who
study China, the Confucian cultural inheritance is characterized by
overlapping, interlocking hierarchies of age, gender, and relationship
that are encapsulated in the Three Bonds (between ruler and subject,
father and son, husband and wife) and the Five Relationships, which
add to the Three bonds the relationships between older and younger
brother and between friends. When individuals performed the
obligations appropriate to their status in these hierarchies, social order
was created and maintained. Thus, the family was the matrix for
society. As Afford notes, Confucius observed that one contributed to
government by being filial to one's parents and a friend to one's
brother.
Even if "immutable Confucian culture" was not, as Elizabeth Perry
colorfully phrased it, "forever lurking like a sea monster beneath the
surface of China's political waters,"" this linking of personal to
10. See PHILIP KUHN, SOULSTEALERS: THE CHINESE SORCERY SCARE OF 1768, at 85-91
(1990); RICHARD J. SMITH, FORTUNE TELLERS AND PHILOSOPHERS: DIVINATION IN
TRADITIONAL CHINESE SOCIETY 39-40, 87-91 (1991).
11. ALFORD, supra note 1, at 25.
12. Id.
13. Tu Wei-ming, The Confucian Tradition in Chinese History, in HERITAGE OF CHINA:
CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES ON CHINESE CIVILIZATION 112, 112 (Paul Ropp ed., 1990).
14. Elizabeth J. Perry, Casting a Chinese "Democracy" Movement. The Roles of Students,
Workers, and Entrepreneurs, in POPULAR PROTEST & POLITICAL CULTURE IN MODERN CHINA,
supra note 2, at 74, 86. Perry's quip was directed at the "unchanging China" arguments of
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political values and of morality to politics has served the interests of
China's leaders regardless of political regime. After the fall of
imperial China in 1912, the Nationalist Party leaders, who established
the Republic of China (R.O.C.), employed these linkages both on the
mainland and, after 1949, in Taiwan. Finally, not only have these
connections often been at the center of the political movements
mounted by the Communists on the mainland since 1949, but
elements of Confucianism itself are now seen by some in the People's
Republic as the source of Taiwan's, South Korea's, Singapore's, and
Hong Kong's economic success.15
However, in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, a
fragile Qing Dynasty (1644-1912) concentrated on the immediate
problem of dealing with the West. In Chapter Three, Alford focuses
on the foreign powers' turn-of-the century introduction into China of
intellectual property ideas, a process he calls "learning the law at
gunpoint,, 16 though the implied threat of force figured more
prominently than overt military pressure. Intellectual property was
of negligible consequence until the 1880's, when Chinese merchants'
appropriation of foreign brand names to avoid transit taxes and
combat the popularity of imports led to demands for trademark
protection. Bilateral treaties in 1902 and 1903 with Britain and the
United States satisfied no one, and the Chinese rebuffed self-serving,
foreign-directed efforts to draft more comprehensive regulations.
Before new rules in 1923 afforded some protection, foreigners'
accomplishments were limited to merely periodic successes at
persuading local officials to use their discretionary power to prevent
trademark and copyright piracy and agreement among themselves on
a set of rules to protect against infringing each other's intellectual
property in China. Less intimidating to local officials than foreigners,
the Chinese fared even worse in defending their intellectual property
against piracy.
Why did China make so little progress? Alford describes both
internal and external reasons, but on balance lays greater weight on
indigenous barriers. Chinese officials, Alford notes, comprehended
that intellectual property fostered commerce, and anti-foreign boycott
organizers used brand-name consciousness to mobilize and direct their
Lucian Pye. I want to thank Wendie Schneider for reminding me of this passage.
15. See generally Confucianism: New Fashion for Old Wisdom, ECONOMIST, Jan. 21, 1995,
at 38 (citing Lee Kuan Yew, Senior Minister of Singapore, on Confucianism as a positive
element in Chinese development and the rise of the Four Tigers); Beijing Hosts Seminar on
Confucianism, Market Economy, Xinhua [New China News Agency], Aug. 3, 1995, available in
LEXIS, Nexis News, Xinhua File; Li Ruihuan: Confucianism Could Serve Practical Activities,
Xinhua [New China News Agency], Oct. 5, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis News, Xinhua File.
16. ALFORD, supra note 1, at 30.
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supporters. Despite this awareness of intellectual property, Alford
acknowledges, there was some merit in foreigners' complaints that the
Chinese lacked a thorough understanding of intellectual property law.
However, most crucial, Afford argues, was foreigners' own failure
either to explain the utility of intellectual property or to train Chinese
in how to enforce relevant laws. Still, even, after the R.O.C. had
promulgated a Copyright Law and Measures to Encourage Industrial
Arts in the early 1930's, little enforcement of any intellectual property
rights occurred. Like its imperial predecessor, the R.O.C. focused
primarily on controlling the content and flow of information. It had
no tolerance "of the formalities of law when they interfered with its
political agenda."' 7 Even if the R.O.C. had been more favorably
disposed toward protecting intellectual property, its struggles against
the Communists and the Japanese sapped its resources and attention,
its administrative and judicial systems were inadequately funded,
competent personnel, and professional integrity, and its citizens lacked
an appropriate legal consciousness.
Chapter Four's title, "Squaring Circles," aptly conveys the dilemmas
of intellectual property policy in the People's Republic of China
(P.R.C.) since 1949. Finding in the Soviet Union's Marxist model an
echo of the Confucian view that intellectual creation is "a product of
the larger society from which it emerged,""i the young P.R.C.
replicated the Soviet disinclination to establish purely private
ownership interests in intellectual property. In order to rebuild the
economy after the Civil War, the P.R.C. came to an accommodation
with individual patent holders. By the mid-1950's, however, the
socialist transformation of the economy essentially eliminated private
ownership and made such compromise unnecessary. Over the next
decade, trademark legislation became a vehicle for supervising quality,
not for granting exclusive rights. By the mid-1960's, increasingly
radical policies led to attacks on property rights and material
incentives in intellectual property as well as more generally to assaults
on professionalism and the formal legal system itself If a steel
worker need not put his name on an ingot he had produced, "why,"
asked a popular Cultural Revolution saying, "should a member of the
intelligentsia enjoy the privilege of putting his name on what he
produces?"19
As China reformed its economic system and opened to the outside
world in the wake of the Cultural Revolution, domestic and foreign
pressures led, by the mid-1980's, to the promulgation of trademark,
17. Id. at 54.
18. Id. at 57.
19. Id. at 65.
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patent, and copyright laws putatively intended to stimulate and
protect creativity and innovation. Critics warned against an anti-
socialist, initiative-squelching, rent-collecting "literary industrial
complex"'2 and suggested that China freely-albeit illegally-import
needed technology. Eventually Deng Xiaoping oversaw a
compromise: a socialist legality with Chinese characteristics that
granted rights circumscribed by responsibility to the state, and, more
importantly, as Alford notes, rights all too often unenforceable for
lack of adequate remedies. As Alford observes, the widespread
stories in the press of infringement actions (brought by both foreign
and domestic parties against domestic violators) might be better seen
as evidence of the law's ineffectiveness than as proof of its thorough
enforcement. In all aspects of intellectual property, but especially in
copyright, where, like previous Chinese states the socialist regime uses
the law primarily to control the flow of ideas to the populace, the
state's conundrum has been how to generate laws that "create new
forms of property without compromising basic state interests.121
Chapter Five describes the process by which Taiwan has moved
from pirating other nations' intellectual property to being a substantial
owner itself. Though the Guomindang regime exercised tight control
of content, it condoned unrestrained reprinting of acceptable foreign
titles. In the late 1950's, pressure from American publishers led
Taiwan, still financially dependent on the United States, to make
some attempts to rein in piracy, but the situation had not improved
appreciably by the 1970's. Moreover, by the 1960's and 1970's, a
global survey of five industries reported that 60 percent of all
counterfeits originated in Taiwan. Highly publicized reforms in the
mid-1980's again had little effect. In 1989, concern over the role of
piracy in its trade imbalance with Taiwan led the United States to
place Taiwan on the Special 301 priority watch list.22 Taiwan and
the United States reached an agreement requiring Taiwan to enforce,
as well as to expand, existing intellectual property legislation. Still,
infringement in computer and electronics continued unabated, and in
an increasingly democratized Taiwan, voices of resentment against
American infringements of sovereignty slowed implementation of the
agreement. To a large extent, Alford argues, only after the 1992
designation of Taiwan as a center for piracy and counterfeiting, and
the attendant threat of losing American markets and alienating
20. Id. at 67.
21. Id. at 76.
22. "Special 301 is a variant of Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act that requires the USTR
[United States Trade Representative] both to notify the Congress regularly of 'priority foreign
countries' failing adequately to protect American intellectual property and to take all measures
needed to address these deficiencies within statutorily mandated guidelines." Id. at 102.
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American political support, did Taiwan begin to make substantive
legislative changes. Yet, indigenous forces also played a role. Courts
broadened their mandate beyond "the maintenance of order,"' and
all elements of the legal system improved in quality. Moreover, as
Taiwanese manufacturers like Acer began to become technical
innovators rather than contract manufacturers, Taiwan's leaders
realized that without a commitment to intellectual property, Taiwan
could not implement its "industrial upgrading."24
In his concluding chapter on American policy, Alford vehemently
argues that the United States has misplaced its priorities by making
intellectual property the centerpiece of its relations with Taiwan and
the P.R.C. He sardonically notes that, while reluctant to "interfere in
China's internal affairs" by speaking out on Tiananmen, the Bush ad-
ministration had no such qualms regarding intellectual property.
Driven by concern that piracy was undermining the capacity of the
entertainment and software industries to close the trade gap with
Asia, the Clinton administration has maintained the pressure, eliciting
various Memoranda of Understanding, but no tangible results. In
sum, our threats extract short-term concessions but are "incapable of
generating the type of domestic rationale and conditions needed to
produce enduring change."'  In clear, forceful strokes, Alford
reiterates his picture of change impeded by China's political culture:
"A system of state determination of which ideas may or may not be
disseminated is fundamentally incompatible with one of strong
intellectual property rights in which individuals have the authority to
determine how expressions of their ideas may be used and ready
access to private legal remedies to vindicate such rights."26 Yet, as
Alford acknowledges, we may be sorry if we get we what want. For
if in the P.R.C., as in Taiwan, real protection of American intellectual
property awaits "further development of Chinese-generated intellec-
tual property of commercial importance," American companies will
find the problem to be not pirates, but "technologically sophisticated"
competitors.27
II
To Steal A Book's power and elegance arise from its arguments'
clarity. Alford lays out his propositions concisely and develops them
relentlessly. By the end, the reader is persuaded that China's political
23. Id. at 110.
24. Id. at 107.
25. Id. at 118.
26. Id. at 119.
27. Id. at 123.
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culture largely explains the absence in China of intellectual property
ideas as conceived in the West. To achieve this clarity, however,
Alford inevitably has had to make choices about which aspects of his
own broad knowledge of a complex culture to share with readers.
Without, I hope, falling into the reviewer's trap of telling the author
what book he should have written, my comments in this Part speak
to these choices and suggest areas of research and avenues of thought
that future scholars can pursue as they build upon the superb foun-
dation laid by Alford.
The Question of Property
For nearly three hundred years, Western jurisprudence and scholar-
ship about intellectual property have been inextricably linked to
debates about the nature of real and personal property.2 Similar
connections are not as easily made in the Chinese context because the
Chinese tradition lacks the essential starting point, a tradition of
explicit analysis of property and property rights.
Certainly, the fourth-century B.C.E. writings of Mencius and Shang
Yang emphasize that social order cannot exist without properly
drawing and protecting land boundaries. 29  Surviving written
materials reveal changing regimes of land ownership; 0 and court
cases from the Qing period not only contain a rich lode of litigation
over property, but also demonstrate that, as in the West, both law and
custom recognized the principle that adding value by applying labor
could establish an ownership claim. Yet, there is no discrete body of
analytical writing on the subject until the twentieth century, when
Chinese writers began to explore not only common and civil law
traditions, but also Marxist theories. Thus, if we are to refine our
understanding of property (and subsequently intellectual property) in
Chinese culture, we must tease out of concrete historical experience
what is unavailable to us in abstract tomes.
Over the last decade, social and legal historians have extended
anthropologists' pioneering work on family division of land by
examining other forms of property and ownership disputes. Alford
28. See generally PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY 37-53 (1994); Wendy J.
Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright The Challenges of Consistency, Consent, and
Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1354, 1354-64 (1989); Grant Hammond, The Legal
Protection of Ideas, 29 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 93, 99-106 (1991); Justin Hughes, The Philosophy
of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 287-366 (1988).
29. Chang Wejen, China's Legal Tradition, at 235,341 (Class materials for course on China's
Legal Tradition, New York University Law School, Spring 1995, on file with author) (citing
discussion by classical Chinese philosophers on the benefits of clarity in land ownership).
30. See ZHANG JINFAN, ZHONGGUO GUDAI FAZHI ZHiDU [CHINA'S ANCIENT LEGAL
SYSTEM] passim (1992).
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cites some of the most recent work from one project,31 but much
remains to be done in the increasingly open legal archives that contain
materials on both the late imperial and Republican periods. We need
to ask whether there was a common core of attitudes or a bundle of
discrete but related attitudes toward property rights. My surmise is
that people's attitudes toward ownership, trespass, infringement,
piracy, counterfeiting, and smuggling are contingent. It makes a
difference who owns property and whether property is rural or urban,
moveable or not. If a necessary commodity is available only through
a government monopoly (e.g., salt in imperial China) or priced high
as a consequence of government import controls (e.g., foreign
software, cd's, and audio tapes in the P.R.C.) or in a situation of
market domination by a single producer (e.g., Microsoft), there seems
to be less respect for the commodity owner's rights. That both
Americans and Chinese who would never shoplift a pack of gum
cavalierly copy each other's software suggests that property-rights
consciousness is extremely dependent on the situation. However, to
move beyond surmise and the anecdotal will, as I have argued above,
require extensive scholarly analysis of the exact nature of property
rights thinking, as revealed in archival materials.
Moreover, as the socialist market economy develops in the P.R.C.,
it will be particularly challenging, but essential, to track through cases
the interaction between evolving ownership forms and evolving
attitudes toward intellectual property. A 1988 patent infringement
case from Shenyang illustrates the nature of the problems that have
been encountered. The case concerned collective factories that once
"belonged" to supervisory "companies"-but which are now behaving
as independent actors who seek competitive advantage, instead of as
"siblings" who share everything.32 This dispute demonstrates that an
intellectual creation is no longer regarded as the "product of the
larger society from which it emerged,"33 but the legitimate possession
of its creator. As the report of the patent dispute editorialized in its
31. ALFORD, supra note 1, at 134 n.6. The papers from the first stage of this project have
appeared in CIVIL LAW IN QING AND REPUBLICAN CHINA (Kathryn Bernhardt & Philip C.C.
Huang eds., 1994) [hereinafter CIVIL LAW]. See Mark Allee, Code, Culture, and Customw
Foundations of Civil Case Verdicts in a Nineteenth-Century Country Court, in CIVIL LAW, supra
at 122; Philip C.C. Huang, Codified Law and Magisterial Adjudication in Qing, in CIVIL LAW,
supra, at 142; Melissa Macauley, Civil and Uncivil Disputes in Southeast Coastal Ching 1723-
1820, in CIVIL LAW, supra, at 85; Madeleine Zelin, Merchant Dispute Mediation in Twentieth
Century Zigong, Sichuan, in CIVIL LAW, supra, at 249; see also Thomas Michael Buoye, Violent
Disputes Over Property Rights in Guangdong During the Qianlong Reign (1736-1795) (1991)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan); David Ray Wakefield, Household
Division in Qing and Republican China: Inheritance, Family Property, and Economic
Development (1992) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California (Los Angeles)).
32. See FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL SYSTEM DAILY], May 31, 1988, at 3.
33. ALFORD, supra note 1, at 57.
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conclusion: Methods of administrative interference have to be
abandoned and rapidly replaced by new ones. "Otherwise, even if we
start out with good intentions, things may go contrary to our
wishes. "
Authorship, Priority, and Specialized Knowledge
Justin Hughes has written that, in the West, there has developed a
"set of central ideas [that] are never permitted to become private
property and are held in a permanent common."" Some of the ideas
are ordinary and others are extraordinary, but all are so important
and society so dependent on them, both for their content and as
signifiers, that they become "de-propertized.', 36 This notion-that an
idea becomes too important for it to remain solely the
author's-resonates with Alford's argument that, in China, the
importance of the past precluded restricting access to its expressions.
Certainly, the concept of the author existed in traditional China.
Indeed, the Romantic notion of the author which, according to Peter
Jaszi, strongly influenced Anglo-American copyright law, 37 had its
counterpart in Chinese literati writing about painting. To the
Romantics, a "work is an extension of the artist's personality., 38 For
the Chinese, "to know [a painter's] art was to know the man him-
self,, 39 for "the character of the artist is seen as the core of pain-
ting."'  Each Chinese painting, and each poem for that matter, was
unique, a singular creation and distinctive manifestation of the moral
character of the artist. Yet as Afford shows, because literati poets
and painters focused on their interaction with the past, innovating
"within the bounds of orthodoxy" and the context of past forms,4'
the idea of copyright never blossomed in China. Painters and poets
welcomed copying as a compliment, a recognition that their work
manifested the power of their moral and artistic mastery. The
imitation recognized their success at capturing the essence, or the dao,
of a subject. Painting "in the manner of" tapped into this moral
quality and generated for the subsequent painter his own sense of
moral power. The presence of this power and the gentleman's
34. FAZHI RIBAO, supra note 32, at 3.
35. Hughes, supra note 28, at 319.
36. Id. at 320.
37. Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of "Authorship" 1991
DUKE L.J. 455,456,
38. Id. at 497.
39. SUSAN BUSH, THE CHINESE LITERATI ON PAINTING: SU SHIH (1037-1101) TO TUNG
CH'I-CHANG (1555-1636) 11 (1971).
40. Id. at 182.
41. ALFORD, supra note 1, at 26, 29.
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resistance to the seduction of money,' separated literati art from
that of the mere copyist or the academician who produced work for
hire.
Like the artists, Confucian philosophers were in a constant
interaction with the past through their predecessors' work and the
Classics, "which contained paradigms for social order and had an
absolute claim to trans-historical truth."43 They felt bound "to the
future by a social obligation to communicate their findings and
discoveries"' and, as a public service to others, made available their
own collections of rare books by publishing them in anthologies.45
In all this, the philosophers' approach paralleled the painters', but the
question of who first had an idea or insight appears to have been of
more concern to philosophers. Indeed, in the mid-eighteenth century,
"evidential scholars wanted to determine fairly and accurately who
should be given priority in research."' Some of the scholars who
made these breakthroughs developed a proprietary interest in their
ideas, treating them as the "cultural property of a particular line
within a lineage."47 Through lineage schools, they tried to confine
generational transmission of these ideas exclusively to their own
descent group. Yet more often than not, because of the prestige to
be gained by broad dissemination of such ideas, this knowledge
passed into "the public domain."'
To find stronger proprietary thinking, we must move beyond the
world of the literati. Those who derived their social prestige from
knowledge more arcane than Confucianism or who earned their
livelihoods from technical knowledge must certainly have been less
willing to have their "intellectual property" depropertized. Alford
notes the efforts of guilds in imperial China to protect trade names
and marks, as well as the support they could sometimes elicit from
officials concerned with maintaining market stability and social order,
but I suspect that there may have been greater popular consciousness
of intellectual property rights than we think. Moreover, much of this
intellectual property comprised knowledge sufficiently specialized to
42. Id. at 29.
43. BENJAMIN ELMAN, FROM PHILOSOPHY TO PHILOLOGY: INTELLECTUAL AND SOCIAL
ASPECTS OF CHANGE IN LATE IMPERIAL CHINA 28 (1984).
44. Id. at 222.
45. Id. at 151. Before the invention of printing, literati made and circulated rubbings of
steles on which the Classics had been inscribed. For a brief review of the publishing industry
in late imperial China, see Evelyn S. Rawski, Economic and Social Foundations of Late Imperial
China, in POPULAR CULTURE IN LATE IMPERIAL CHINA 21-28 (David Johnson et al. eds., 1985).
46. ELMAN, supra note 43, at 223.
47. See BENJAMIN ELMAN, CLASSICISM, POLITICS AND KINSHIP: THE CH'ANG-CHOU




fall outside the "permanent common." Those who owned and
mastered sectarian religious texts "acquired considerable religious
authority."49 And specialists in geomancy (fengshui), fortune-telling,
and ritual maintained their position in society even as printed
handbooks made much of their subject matter more generally
available because they maintained a "large stock of handwritten
materials" in which their trade secrets continued to reside.50
Among these groups, unlike among the literati, there was nothing
to be gained and much to be lost by freely disseminating rather than
monopolizing their "cultural property." The system of transmission
from father to son or from master to acolyte might be seen as a self-
enforcing intellectual property regime. An apt contemporary example
is provided by a privately owned restaurant in Chengdu that sells a
particular type of beancurd. Since the 1920's, the family has carefully
guarded its recipes, which the grandson of the creator variously refers
to as the family's trade secrets, intellectual property, and capital. In
the 1950's, the shop was subjected to "socialist transformation" and
the family's specialized knowledged "depropertized" by the state. But
since then, the family has returned to its former practice of providing
recipes to outsiders only after the "licensee" pays a fee and signs an
agreement not to compete.51
Thus, I would argue, even if one cannot find it inscribed in codes
or litigated in courts, an intellectual property rights consciousness, or
sensibility, has probably existed in China for a long time. To uncover
and understand this sensibility, we must move outside the sphere of
literati painters and scholars. We need to attempt to examine under
what circumstances various professional texts-coroner's manuals,
contract manuals, magistrate's handbooks, novels, private editions of
the Qing Code-were produced and sold. We need answers to a
broad set of questions: Did the spread of newspapers and the
development of new forms of literature for the "middling classes"
produce new attitudes toward copyright?52 Was being first to market
the only way publishers could protect themselves against piracy?53
49. Susan Naquin, The Transmission of White Lotus Sectarianism in Late Imperial China, in
POPULAR CULTURE IN LATE IMPERIAL CHINA, supra note 45, at 255, 259.
50. See James Hayes, Specialists and Written Materials in the Village World, in POPULAR
CULTURE IN LATE IMPERIAL CHINA, supra note 45, at 75, 108. On geomancy, see SMITH, supra
note 10, at 131-71.
51. Interviews with the owner (July 1993, July 1994) (interviews granted on condition of
anonymity). Socialist transformation also meant that the state claimed the rights to use the
family name in association with the word for beancurd. When the grandson opened his own
shop using his surname as the business name, the city government threatened to bring suit. To
avoid litigation, the man simply added a diminutive before the surname.
52. For an illustration of such a phenomenon, see ALFORD, supra note 1, at 44-45.
53. We know from Evelyn Rawski about the enormous scope and vitality of late imperial
publishing. Rawski, supra note 45. We also need to know how, without copyright, publishers
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Were the "courts" of the nascent late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-
century chambers of commerce a bridge between the private, guild-
based and public, court-based enforcement of intellectual property?
Finally, how influential was the model presented by the enclaves
under foreign control?
Confucianism, Political Culture, and the Flow of Ideas
Throughout the text, Afford uses Confucianism as short-hand for
a complex body of ideas.55 Though Alford surely did not intend it,
readers may erroneously infer an enduring solidity to Confucianism.
Certainly, there existed a dominant orthodoxy, an "imperial Con-
fucianism" that the state demanded be reproduced in the civil service
examination. There also existed among scholars a mainstream
interpretation of the past. But we should remember not to take the
imperial Confucianism that sought to control the flow of ideas as
representative of Confucianism as a whole.56 The imperial Con-
fucian state was neither as aggressive nor as successful in controlling
the flow of ideas as its twentieth-century successors.
Certainly, the late imperial state sought to maintain both an
orthodoxy and an orthopraxy (respectively, correctness in thought and
action).57 The state could be highly effective in expunging dissidence
if it committed substantial resources to a full-scale literary in-
quisition58  or widespread investigation.59  However, unless
heterodoxy or heteropraxy posed an immediate and concrete threat
to social and political order, or a group of scholars appeared to
constitute a faction with a distinct political agenda, the state tended
not to interfere. On the one hand, it could not regularly expend the
were able to remain profitable and viable.
54. Evidence that chambers of commerce played such a role is provided by a 1921 settlement
by the Suzhou Chamber of Commerce of a trademark dispute. In re Song Zhu Lu Hui, Yi
2/1/882 (April 2, 1921) (available in Suzhou Chamber of Commerce Archives, Suzhou Municipal
Archives). On chambers of commerce, see also sources cited infra note 72.
55. For a brief but comprehensive introduction to Confucianism, see Tu, supra note 13, at
112-37.
56. Tu Wei-ming, for example, argues that the "Confucianization of Chinese society reached
its apex during the Ch'ing... which consciously and ingeniously transformed Confucian teaching
into a political ideology, indeed a mechanism of symbolic control." Id. at 135.
57. On the interaction of these two concepts, see DEATH RITUAL IN LATE IMPERIAL AND
MODERN CHINA 3-34 (James Watson & Evelyn Rawski eds., 1990). On orthodoxy, see, as well,
the work of K.C. Liu, who argues that "the state could effectively mold the culture-defined as
the pattern of meaning-but perhaps only along the lines on which that culture was already
evolving." Socioethics as Orthodoxy, in ORTHODOXY IN LATE IMPERIAL CHINA 53,54 (Kwang-
Ching Liu ed., 1990).
58. See L. CARRINGTON GOODRICH, THE LITERARY INQUISITION OF CH'IEN-LUNG (1966);
R. KENT Guy, THE EMPEROR'S FOUR TREASURES: SCHOLARS AND THE STATE IN THE LATE
CH'IEN-LUNG ERA (1987); ZHONGGUO JJNSHU DAGUAN [A COMPLETE INTRODUCTION TO
CHINESE BANNED BOOKS] (An Pingqiu & Zhang Peiheng eds., 1990).
59. See generally KUHN, supra note 10.
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required money and bureaucratic energy. On the other hand, except
in times of extraordinary crisis, the late imperial state, as Alford
demonstrates, was highly confident of the hegemonic power of its
orthodox Confucian ideology.
Thus, until the Qing dynasty partially blamed the fall of the
preceding Ming dynasty (1368-1644) on Wang Yangming's intuitionist
attack on conventional Confucianism, other scholars-but not the
state-combatted Wang's philosophical heresies. The political
implications of the views espoused by the late Ming academies, not
their unorthodox Confusianism, prompted the government's hostility.
In the early Qing, independent writers who prepared study aids
published by private bookshops influenced civil service examinations.
The government never fully succeeded in having only authorized
official selections printed.' By the mid-eighteenth century the
kaozheng school of evidential scholarship challenged (correctly) the
authenticity of the versions of the Classics that undergirded the
dominant Confucian ideology, thereby laying the foundation for late-
nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century scholars' "rejection of the
entire Confucian legacy."'" Yet until these ideas constituted a
manifest threat, the government did not attempt to silence their
advocates. In sum, the paternalist political culture of late imperial
China accommodated the flow of a broad-albeit not un-
limited-spectrum of information.
The political cultures in the party-states of the R.O.C. and the
P.R.C. have condoned a much narrower range of views. The R.O.C.
benchmark of truth was the thought of Sun Yatsen, its first president
and the founder of the Nationalist Party. However, the R.O.C. lacked
the capacity to fully control the flow and content of information until
after the government fled to Taiwan. There, as Alford shows, it
created a system of copyright registration that not only generated
funding for censorship administration but also served as a sieve
filtering out unwanted ideas. The P.R.C. uses a similar system that
withholds copyright protection "from works the publication or
distribution of which is prohibited by law"62 and permits publication
of materials only after the authorities have reviewed the content and
issued a "registration number."'
60. Kai-wing Chow, Discourse, Examination, and Local Elite: The Invention of the Tung-
ch'eng School in Ch'ing China, in EDUCATION AND SOCIETY IN LATE IMPERIAL CHINA, 1600-
1900, at 185, 192 (Benjamin Elman & Alexander Woodside eds., 1994).
61. ELMAN, supra note 43, at 113, 32.
62. PRACTICAL HANDBOOK OF LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA GOVERNING
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 199 (1994) (quoting Copyright Law of the P.R.C., art. 4).
63. A literal translation of the Chinese term is book number. ALFORD, supra note 1, at 79.
On evasion of this system of control, see ORVILLE SCHELL, THE MANDATE OF HEAVEN 293-310
(1994).
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Certainly, the primary goal of the P.R.C.'s regulations is to
censor,64 and, Alford argues, "a system of state determination of
which ideas may or may not be disseminated is fundamentally
incompatible with one of strong intellectual property rights in which
individuals have the authority to determine how expressions of their
ideas may be used and ready access to private legal remedies to
vindicate such rights.165  Yet this process of pre-publication
registration suggests how, as the P.R.C. develops a socialist market
economy, it intends to create a system of strong intellectual property
rights for approved ideas. The key is registration. Just as paying
taxes on a land transaction in imperial China made a claim litigable,
pre-publication registration is the mark of the socialist state's
cognizance of ownership and the right to seek protection of it in the
courts. Dissident works, to the extent that they get published at all,
are left unprotected; and the Chinese can claim to have created
intellectual property rights with "Chinese characteristics."
Precisely because copyright can cut two ways, either opening or
closing the flow of information, some scholars are inclined to the view
that less, rather than more, copyright is conducive to open society.
Peter Jaszi observes that a basic contradiction inheres in copyright: It
aims to encourage production and dissemination of works, yet confers
on their creators "the power to restrict or deny distribution., 66 In
a talk on the metaphor of the frontier in the information age, James
Boyle also touched on this point.67 To settle the frontier is to
demarcate, enclose, and curtail the very openness, freedom and
opportunity that attracted settlers in the first place. Self-policing,
decentralized, democratic structures are soon replaced by rule-making,
corporate institutions discomfited by the alleged chaos and disorder
of the frontier. Boyle was not opposed to rules per se, but called for
ones that permitted maximum use of society's store of intellectual
property-a large "permanent common." Similarly, Rosemary
Coombe argues that intellectual property, especially trademark and
copyright, by depriving us "of the optimal cultural conditions for
dialogic practice," impedes debate, thereby producing a less open
64. For example, the Liaoning Provincial Government fined the publisher of an unauthorized
translation of a Danielle Steel novel, not for violating the original's copyright, but for bypassing
registration in order to sell a text with "inappropriate content." Interview with Chen Dayang,
freelance translator, in Raleigh, N.C. (Sept. 1988).
65. ALFORD, supra note 1, at 119.
66. Jaszi, supra note 37, at 463.
67. James Boyle, The Frontier as Metaphor in the Information Age, Address at the Duke
University Frontiers of Legal Thought Symposium on Law in the Information Age: The First
Amendment, Privacy and Electronic Networks (Jan. 27, 1995).
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society.6 Strong property rights may be a bulwark for protecting
individual liberties against the state. But, if property rights are too
strong, powerful individuals or groups may use them to suppress the
marginal or powerless.
This notion of wielding intellectual property as a club against the
disadvantaged may partially explain the blithe disregard in the P.R.C.
and the R.O.C. for American trademarks and copyrights. On both
sides of the Taiwan Straits, Alford makes clear, resentment against
American bullying runs high. On the mainland, there is strong
sentiment that "the world [that is, the West] owes China something"
for past humiliations. Scholars see clashes such as the one over
intellectual property not as cultural but as economic conflicts.
69
Thus, intellectual property pirates know full well that their conduct is
illegal, but some Chinese may think appropriating American
intellectual property is a justifiable act of self-defense against
economic imperialism. Or, to put it more colorfully: "To screw
foreigners is patriotic. '  A more benign explanation might be that
Chinese counterfeiters are simply using the iconographic power of a
foreign trademark to lend cachet to their product.71 But in any case,
as Afford emphatically demonstrates, rights consciousness of any sort
cannot develop in a political culture that suppresses rather than
nurtures negotiation and struggle over meaning.
The Role of Courts
Over the last several years, as case materials from late-imperial and
Republican China have become available, American and Chinese
researchers have begun to produce a body of archival-based scholar-
ship that demonstrates greater use of courts and quasi-judicial
institutions (e.g., the "courts" of chambers of commerce) than
previously assumed.72 Aford cites this literature, but may underes-
68. Rosemary J. Coombe, Objects of Property and Subjects of Politics: Intellectual Property
Laws and Democratic Dialogue, 69 TEx. L. REV. 1860, 1866 (1991).
69. Geremie Barmd, To Screw Foreigners is Patriotic: China's Avant-Garde Nationalists, 34
CHINA J. 213, 216 (1995).
70. Id. at 209. The original use of the phrase denoted the physical act of screwing. Barmd
and I use it more generally in the figurative sense.
71. It is important to distinguish among the different kinds of pirating and counterfeiting.
For example, several years ago one would see in China t-shirts for teams such as the Houston
Bulls with pictures of baseball players. The intent here was to use English names to increase
the attractiveness of the shirt, much as putting the Hooters NASCAR logo on baseball caps does
today. From conversations with purchasers of these items, it is clear consumers are utterly
unaware of any significance or lack thereof in these trademarks. However, purchasers of
products with the Motorola, Disney, Casio, or IBM logos or the brand names of high quality
Chinese liquors anticipate that the trademark represents value. It is the intent of counterfeiters
to use those implications to deceive the customer.
72. See generally Ma Min, Judicial Authority and the Chamber of Commerce: Merchant
Dispute Mediation and Adjudication in Suzhou City in the Late Qing, Address at Luce
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timate the extent of this phenomena, especially for the Republican-
period.73 The Number Two Historical Archives in Nanjing possesses
an enormous documentary record of proceedings from Republican
period judicial and quasi-judicial institutions at both the national and
provincial levels. My survey of the catalogues and perusal of some
cases suggests that these materials can help us understand how the
Chinese thought about property and intellectual property issues, how
foreign ideas and pressures affected China's legal culture, and how
much access there was outside major metropolitan areas to viable
courts, competent judges, and Western-trained lawyers. The view of
British expatriates in China that courts "reached decisions irrespective
of the existence of duly registered trademarks,, 74  needs to be
reviewed in light of the arguments and decisions in these records.
Whatever new findings researchers may make, they are unlikely to
challenge Alford's analysis that the Guomindang had little ap-
preciation of a strong, independent legal system. Nevertheless, if
courts exist and offer an iota of procedural and substantive justice, the
Chinese, just as other people, will turn to them as a last resort to
manage conflict. They will turn to them even in chaotic times on the
cusp of political change that will render the courts' decisions moot,
75
and even if the courts cannot fully protect citizens' civil and political
rights because property rights take precedence. Either for want of
will or capacity, the courts may not be able to enforce these decisions,
but use of courts may create habits and expectations that can, in turn,
lead to greater civil and political rights.76
Conference Symposium at UCLA on "Code and Practice in Imperial Chinese Law" (Aug. 8-10,
1993). Professor Ma also has a forthcoming monograph on the Suzhou Chamber of Commerce.
The Suzhou Municipal Archives has compiled an unpublished three-volume set of materials on
the Suzhou Chamber. Kwang Man Bun discusses the conflict processing work of the Tianjin
Chamber of Commerce in The Merchant World of Tianjin: Society and Economy of a Chinese
City (1990) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University). On chambers of commerce
in general, see Yu HEPING, ZAOQJ SHANGHUI YU ZHONGGUO XIANDAi HUA [EARLY
CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE AND CHINA'S MODERNIZATION] (1993). The Liaoning Provincial
Archives contains substantial holdings from the Fengtian Chamber of Commerce. LIAONING
SHENG DANG'AN GUAN ZHINAN [A GUIDE TO THE LIAONING PROVINCIAL ARCHIVES] 67
(1993).
73. ALFORD, supra note 1, at 148 n.154.
74. ALFORD, supra note 1, at 53. The public catalogue for the Number Two Archives is a
mere hint of the richness of the actual holdings. See ZHONGGUO DI'ER LISHI DANG'AN GUAN
JIANMING ZHINAN [A BRIEF GUIDE TO THE SECOND HISTORICAL ARCHIVES OF CHINA] 103-07
(1987). Mary Buck is drawing on these materials for a dissertation at Harvard on judicial
reasoning.
75. For example, a case of administration litigation over water usage was still being fought
out in October 1949. See, e.g., Case 29.147, Administrative Courts, Number Two Historical
Archives, Nanjing. Such behavior is of course not peculiar to China. Paul Haagen, my
colleague at Duke, has recently come across cases from Atlanta on the eve of its fall to Sherman
in which ownership disputes over slaves were still being litigated.
76. Cf. ALFORD, supra note 1, at 120. I make this point more fully in Jonathan Ocko,
Introduction to Special Issue on Emerging Framework of Chinese Civil Law, 52 LAW &
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This is why it will be important for us to track carefully the
decisions on intellectual property that issue from courts in Taiwan and
the P.R.C. By looking at those that are solely domestic as well as
those that involve American parties, we can begin to construct an
understanding of the legal sensibility and reasoning being applied: Is
it rights-based; is it being shaped by indigenous or international
values; are local courts insulated from domestic administrative
pressures and foreign policy concerns; do courts understand what
intellectual property is? The evidence to date, ably presented by
Alford, is that, in the P.R.C. administrative intervention and un-
familiarity with intellectual property concepts remain major problems.
Moreover, on both sides of the Taiwan straits, foreign and domestic
parties are victimized by courts' protection of local interests. 77
The case of Kellogg's Corn Flakes is illustrative on several
points.78 Soon after successfully establishing the product in southern
China, Kellogg's discovered a Chinese company selling a cereal in
packaging that was nearly identical to its own. The Chinese brand
name, a transliteration of Kellogg's, was written in Kellogg's
distinctive script. Every statement on the box, including the
copyrighted slogans was precisely replicated. The only visible
difference was the picture of the Chinese product, which looked more
like Frito's than corn flakes. At the court of first instance, Kellogg's
lost its case for trademark infringement. Relying on a tendentious
line of reasoning and reading of the evidence, the local court not only
found for the defendant, but also ordered Kellogg's to pay court costs
and damages. Kellogg's appealed to the provincial high court, which,
soon after the U.S. and China signed an intellectual property
Memorandum of Understanding in February 1995, overturned the
initial decision.79 Though it provided sound legal reasons, one also
wonders whether the high court acted without instruction from
political authorities. At least in this instance, the absence of complete
judicial independence may have proved salutary for U.S. businesses.
III
For the China specialist, To Steal a Book is a stimulating, challen-
ging work whose findings touch on a number of central questions.
CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 17-22 (1989). See also Stanley Lubman, Introduction: The Future of
Chinese Law, 141 CHINA Q. 1, 20 (1995).
77. ALFORD, supra note 1, at 91-92. Interview with Supreme Court judge from Taiwan, in
Durham, N.C. (Feb. 1, 1996) (interview granted on condition of anonymity).
78. Interview with Li Jingbing, partner in the Beijing Beidou Firm, which represented
Kellogg's, in Beijing, China (Mar. 10, 1995).
79. On the MOU, see the testimony to Congress of Deputy U.S. Trade Representative
Charlene Barshefsky, NEXIS, News/Curnews, (Mar. 2, 1995).
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Although I have minor disagreements with some conclusions and feel
that at times Alford's emphasis on an enduring Chinese political
culture leads him to forget briefly his own warning-"at no time is
any society's culture monolithic" 8°-I still offer it an academic's
highest praise: I commend To Steal a Book to the non-specialist as an
engaging, reliable guide to complex issues such as Chinese and
comparative intellectual property, Sino-foreign legal interaction, and
current American trade policy toward China. Alford's work reminds
the non-specialist that, despite the current focus on bilateral tensions
and American losses, the course of intellectual property law in China
has been and will be shaped by China's political culture and by the
rights and interests of Chinese authors, inventors, and companies.
One hopes that when Professor Afford completes his current
research on the impact of American legal education on a generation
of Chinese lawyers and jurists, he will return to the subject of
intellectual property. In the meantime, one expects that many
readers, like the Chinese literati Afford discusses, will be paying his
book the ultimate compliment, and making "fair use" of it in their
own work.
80. ALFORD, supra note 1, at 6.
